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Cherry v. United States: a missed objection and a vacated sentence
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, No. 21-2231.
Decided November 5, 2026.
Opinion by Judge Sykes, joined by Judges Rovner and St. Eve.
DeAndre Cherry was convicted by a jury in the Northern District of Illinois of possessing 100 grams or more of heroin with intent to distribute. (Slip op. 1, 5.) He received 20 years in prison and the minimum 8-year term of supervised release. (Slip op. 2, 8.) After losing his direct appeal, he filed a handwritten, 86-page § 2255 motion without a lawyer. (Slip op. 8.) The district court (No. 20 CV 4752) denied it. The Seventh Circuit later appointed counsel for his appeal. (Slip op. 1, 8–9.)
What happened
Before sentencing, the government filed an information relying on Mr. Cherry's 2003 Illinois conviction for manufacturing or delivering cocaine as "a prior conviction for a felony drug offense." That triggered the enhanced penalties in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). (Slip op. 1–2, 6.) The enhancement raised his minimum prison term from 5 to 10 years, his maximum from 40 years to life, and his minimum supervised release from 4 to 8 years. (Slip op. 6, 13.) His defense lawyer did not object. (Slip op. 7.)
Because the maximum became life, his career-offender offense level was 37 instead of 34. His Guidelines range became 360 months to life instead of 262 to 327 months. (Slip op. 13.) The prosecutor asked for 20 years. The defense asked for the 10-year minimum. The judge imposed 20 years. He pointed to Mr. Cherry's record and said a "substantial period of incarceration" was needed. (Slip op. 7–8.)
The reason the missed objection later mattered is a 2020 decision. Almost three years after the sentencing, the Seventh Circuit held in United States v. Ruth that Illinois's definition of cocaine is broader than the federal one. Under the categorical approach, an Illinois cocaine conviction under section 401 is "not a predicate 'felony drug offense'" for a § 841(b)(1) enhancement. (Slip op. 10.) Relying on the court's 2023 decision in Coleman v. United States, the government conceded that counsel performed deficiently by not raising that challenge. (Slip op. 10–11.)
What the court decided
The Seventh Circuit accepted that concession. It "assume[d]" deficient performance because the government had agreed counsel fell short. (Slip op. 12.) The fight was over prejudice: whether there was a reasonable probability of a lower sentence. (Slip op. 9.)
The government argued that the enhancement did not matter because the 20-year sentence was already 10 years below the 30-years-to-life Guidelines range. According to the government, the § 3553(a) factors, especially Mr. Cherry's criminal history, were what drove the sentence. (Slip op. 12–14.)
The Seventh Circuit disagreed.
A wrong, higher starting point is usually enough to show prejudice. The Guidelines are the "starting point" and "lodestar" of sentencing. In most cases, a defendant whose judge started from an incorrect, higher range has shown a reasonable probability of a different outcome. (Slip op. 13–14.) The higher statutory minimum and maximum also have an "anchoring effect." (Slip op. 14.)
The judge also never said the error did not matter. A judge's explanation can overcome the presumption of prejudice if the judge makes clear the sentence rests on factors independent of the Guidelines, for example by saying he "would have imposed the same sentence" anyway. Here, the court said, the judge "certainly didn't say as much." His reference to Mr. Cherry's criminal history was "vague." It did not show that 20 years was right "irrespective of" the enhancement. (Slip op. 14–15.)
Supervised release was part of the harm as well. The government conceded that the missed objection prejudiced Mr. Cherry at least by producing an 8-year supervised-release term. The court called that concession "appropriate," because the record gave "no clue" what the judge would have done with a 4-year minimum. Because prison and supervised release are one "sentencing package," the court would not try to separate them. (Slip op. 15–16.)
The court vacated the sentence and sent the case back for resentencing. It said there is "no guarantee" of a lower sentence and that the government may argue for the same one. (Slip op. 16, 20.)
Mr. Cherry did not win everything. The court rejected his other two claims. His challenge to the career-offender enhancement failed under Ruth, because the Guidelines' "controlled substance offense" definition is broader and the Illinois conviction still counts there. (Slip op. 16–18.) His challenge to an agent's testimony about what the informant said failed for lack of prejudice, given the limiting instruction and the strength of the evidence. (Slip op. 18–20.) His conviction stands. (Slip op. 20.)
Why this matters
People who file § 2255 motions run into this prejudice argument often. When a lawyer's mistake raises the starting point for a sentence, the government cannot defeat prejudice just by saying the judge cared about criminal history. Unless the judge clearly said the same sentence would have been imposed regardless, the presumption of prejudice holds. (Slip op. 14–15.) The decision also confirms that a wrongly increased supervised-release minimum is real prejudice, and that the prison term and supervised release are reviewed together. (Slip op. 15–16.)
The opinion is more careful than a simple win might suggest. The court accepted deficient performance only because the government conceded it. It noted that Coleman "now stands on shaky ground" after Neal and Elion (both 2025), which say counsel is deficient only if an argument was so clearly foreshadowed "that no reasonable attorney would fail to make it." (Slip op. 11–12.) Without a concession, a similar claim could face a harder fight on the first Strickland prong.
Practical steps
Check what prior conviction triggered any § 841(b)(1) enhancement. In the Seventh Circuit, Ruth holds that an Illinois section-401 cocaine conviction is not a "felony drug offense" for that enhancement. (Slip op. 10.) The career-offender Guidelines use a different, broader test. (Slip op. 17.)
Read the sentencing transcript for language about imposing the "same sentence" anyway. Whether the judge said that was decisive here. (Slip op. 14–15.)
Do not overlook supervised release. An enhancement that raised the minimum supervised-release term can be part of the prejudice. (Slip op. 15.)
Name your authority in a pro se § 2255. The government dropped a waiver argument because Mr. Cherry's handwritten motion had cited Ruth. (Slip op. 11 n.3.)
Mind the deadline. A § 2255 motion generally must be filed within one year of the triggering dates listed in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). Talk to a lawyer about timing before relying on any new decision.
Sources
Cherry v. United States, No. 21-2231 (7th Cir. Nov. 5, 2026) (Sykes, J.), slip opinion, Doc. 52, official PDF on GovInfo: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-ca7-21-02231/pdf/USCOURTS-ca7-21-02231-0.pdf
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (text): https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/2255

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