SAMARITAN NEWSLETTER – 04-27-2026

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SENTENCING GUIDELINE CHANGES FOR NOVEMBER 2026

No changes in meth, no changes in career offender status. -- The proposed amendments that made it through the Commission’s process include

addition of new paths for offenders to get credit for presentence rehabilitative efforts; increased emphasis on the availability of sentences eligible for probation, home confinement and split sentences; restructuring of the loss table for economic crimes to account for inflation over the past decade; elimination of the sophisticated means enhancement, and a new enhancement to account for the non-economic harm suffered by victims of economic crimes. *** Last December, the Commission asked for public comment on options to change the methamphetamine guidelines. One proposal is to simply eliminate the Guidelines distinction among a meth mixture, meth (actual), and high-purity ice. All meth would be scored the same. An alternative option would be to keep the distinctions in the current meth Guidelines but offer reductions for people who had minor roles, who qualified for the 18 USC 3553(f) safety valve, or who were involved only because of family relationships or duress. *** The change in the “career offender” guidelines would have abandoned the current “categorical approach” to what prior convictions were crimes of violence or drug offenses, substituting instead a list of federal and state crimes that apply. Burglary would no longer apply, felonies of any kind for which the defendant served less than 90 days would not apply, and defendants would have a chance to show that some crimes of violence should not count because their conduct was completely nonviolent.

SUPREME COURT. District of Columbia v. R.W. 2026 U.S. LEXIS 1858, No. 25-248 (S. Ct. Apt. 20, 2026). In the early morning hours, a Metropolitan Police officer in Washington, D.C., responded to a radio dispatch about a suspicious vehicle at a specific location. Upon arrival, the officer observed two individuals fleeing from the car without any apparent provocation, leaving at least one car door open. The driver, R.W., then began to back the car out of its parking space with the rear door still open. The officer ordered R.W. to put his hands up and subsequently recovered evidence leading to charges including unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and felony receipt of stolen property. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia conducted a suppression hearing and denied R.W.’s motion to suppress, finding that the officer had reasonable suspicion based on the dispatch, the passengers’ flight, the late hour, and the car’s movement. After a bench trial, the court adjudicated R.W. delinquent on all counts. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed the suppression ruling and vacated the adjudication. It held the officer lacked reasonable suspicion, after discounting the dispatch and the companions’ flight as relevant factors. The Supreme Court reviewed the case and held the officer did have reasonable suspicion to stop R.W. The Court emphasized the totality-of-the-circumstances test must be used, and the Court of Appeals erred by disregarding key facts, such as the dispatch and the passengers’ flight, from its analysis. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The holding is that, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer’s stop was supported by reasonable suspicion as required by the Fourth Amendment.

CR.RIS/MEDICAL. The District of South Carolina granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Michael Glover, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83681 (D. S.C. Apr. 16, 2026). The defendant’s third compassionate release motion contended his terminal medical condition constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason for consideration of his immediate release. Glover suffers from anemia, oxygen dependency 24 hours per day, mobility with electrical wheelchair, confined to a bed or wheelchair 75% of the day, history of cavity abscess of the lungs, possible lung

transplant, gout, sleep apnea, scarring of the lungs, emphysema, iron deficiency, pulmonary fibrosis/hypertension, end stage lung disease, gallstones, lung function at 50% capacity, and end stage Sarcoidosis. The defendant asserted that most of his life endangering medical conditions are a direct result of the BOP shortfalls and their inability to provide the prompt medical attention that he requires. The defendant acknowledged that while some of his medical ailments did exist prior

to sentencing, those ailments have significantly worsened since his imprisonment.

The defendant contended that as a result of his severely compromised medical

conditions, he faces a much greater risk of harm in the prison's communal environment from infectious diseases such as COVID-19, influenza, or the common cold. He stated he lives in daily fear of becoming sick due to transmission between inmates and any minor infection could end his life. Sentence reduced to time served.

CR.RIS/DISPARITY. The Western District of Virginia partially granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Kareem Shaw, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83475 (W.D. Va. Apr. 15, 2026). Shaw pled guilty to one count of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute a measurable quantity of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of heroin, and he was sentenced to 216 months. Shaw filed his first motion for compassionate release, arguing among other things that following a change in the law, he no longer would be considered a career offender under 4B1.1(a) of the guidelines, and the court agreed and reduced his sentence to 194 months. Shaw sought relief under USSG 1B1.13(b)(6) and (c), which provide that in some circumstances, when a defendant is serving an unusually long sentence, a change in the law can create an extraordinary and compelling reason that warrants a sentence reduction. The court found that 1B1.13(b)(6) and (c) of the guidelines are consistent with 18 USC 3582(c)(1)(A) and 28 USC 994(t). The court found that the 19-month difference between Shaw's current sentence of 194 months and the 175-month sentence he likely would be assessed today is a "gross disparity" that establishes an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction in accordance with USSG 1B1.13(b)(6). Sentence reduced to 175 months.

CR.RIS/DISPARITY/REHABILITATION/MEDICAL. The District of Maryland granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Antonio Davis, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78381 (D. Md. Apr. 10, 2026). Davis was convicted of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, and three related firearms offenses and he was sentenced to a total term of 295 months. Davis's sentence was reduced to 248 months based on Amendment 782. Davis proffered four reasons that he contends present "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for relief: (1) an injury he suffered while incarcerated; (2) circumstances related to the COVID-19 Pandemic; (3) a change in law producing a gross disparity between the sentence he received and that he would likely receive today; and (4) the disparity between his sentence and those of his co-conspirators. The court held that Davis had shown an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release based on the disparity between his sentence and those of his co-conspirators. Sentence reduced from 248 months to 188 months.

CR.RIS/REHABILITATION/DISPARITY. The Western District of New York granted in part a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Gary James, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79026 (W.D. N.Y. Apr. 10, 2026). Defendant pled guilty to four counts charging him with assault with intent to rob; assault of a person assisting an Officer of the United States; attempted murder of an Officer of the United States; and use of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence. York was sentenced to aggregate term of 330 months. Defendant made three primary arguments why extraordinary and compelling reasons exist to reduce his sentence: (1) Chemung County Court ought to have run a six-year state sentence concurrent to his federal sentence, but this never occurred; (2) he was either misclassified as a career offender or the law resulting in that classification "is no longer applicable"; and (3) he has rehabilitated himself. Sentence of 330 months reduced to 308 months.

APPEAL/2241/FSA. The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded Benson v. Warden FCI Edgefield, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 11454 (4th Cir. Apr. 22, 2026). A federal prisoner was sentenced in Dec. 2020 and, due to pending charges in another jurisdiction, was held at a detention center in Rhode Island rather than being promptly transferred to his designated BOP facility in South Carolina. During this period of post-sentencing detention, the prisoner claims to have participated in programs under the First Step Act (FSA), thereby accruing approximately 150 days of time credits, which could reduce his time in custody. However, the BOP did not recognize these credits because he had not undergone a formal risk and needs assessment—the BOP’s prerequisite for awarding such credits—until his eventual arrival at the designated facility in March 2022. After exhausting administrative remedies, the prisoner filed a pro se habeas petition in the District of South Carolina, seeking recognition of his alleged FSA credits. The magistrate judge, without briefing or discovery, recommended dismissal. The district court adopted this recommendation, concluding that the BOP’s regulation reasonably required an initial assessment before credits could be earned, and applied Chevron deference to uphold the agency's interpretation. The district court also found no evidence the prisoner had “successfully participated” in qualifying programs before arrival at the BOP facility and dismissed the petition without prejudice, refusing to require a government response. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded and held the case was not moot, as the prisoner could still benefit from the FSA credits if his risk status changed or a warden approved his release. The court further held that, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, which overturned Chevron deference, the district court must independently determine whether the BOP’s interpretation of “successful participation” aligns with the best reading of the statute.