SAMARITAN NEWSLETTER – 03-30- 2026

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SUPREME COURT/SUPERVISED RELEASE. Rico v. United States, 2026 U.S. LEXIS 1490, No. 24-1056 (S. Ct. Mar. 25, 2026). The case concerns a federal defendant who, after serving a prison sentence for drug trafficking, began a term of supervised release. Following her initial release, she violated the conditions of supervised release, resulting in revocation and a new term of supervised release. During her second supervised release period, she again violated the conditions by changing her address without notifying her probation officer. A warrant was issued, but authorities did not apprehend her until over a year after her supervised release term was scheduled to expire. While absconding, she committed a separate state drug offense and was convicted in state court. The United States District Court concluded that her state drug offense, committed after her supervised release term had expired by the original schedule, constituted a violation of supervised release because her period was tolled (paused) while she was absconding. The court treated the drug offense as a Grade A violation and imposed another prison sentence followed by a new term of supervised release. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, adopting the view that abscondment automatically tolled the supervised release period, allowing post-expiration violations to be treated as if they occurred during the term. The Supreme Court held the Sentencing Reform Act does not authorize an automatic extension of a supervised release term when a defendant absconds. The Act specifies when supervised release begins and ends, provides mechanisms for revocation and extension under defined circumstances, and allows delayed adjudication of violations only for conduct occurring before expiration if a warrant or summons issues before the term ends. The Court concluded that abscondment does not automatically extend or toll the supervised release term beyond its judicially prescribed limit. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

APPEAL/CR.RIS. The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded United States v. Rojas, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 8642 (11th Cir. Mar. 25, 2026). Rojas, who is serving a 180-month sentence, filed a motion for compassionate release in June 2025, relying in part on his recent cancer diagnosis. The Government opposed Rojas's motion, arguing, in relevant part, that he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, under 18 USC 3582(c)(1)(A). The Government did not argue that Rojas's motion should be denied on the merits. After receiving the Government's response, the district court denied Rojas's motion in a paperless order, explaining that Rojas had "failed to exhaust his administrative remedies." In his pro se brief, Rojas argued that he did, in fact, exhaust his administrative remedies. The Government now agrees. The court vacated the district court's ruling, which denied Rojas's motion solely for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

CR.RIS/MEDICAL. The District of Utah granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Jervis, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55632 (D. Utah Mar. 11, 2026). The court sentenced Jervis to 60-months after a guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute α-PHP, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. Jervis has been diagnosed with stage IV cancer. His illness is considered terminal and he has a limited life expectancy. Based on the government's representations regarding Jervis' prognosis, the court found that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist to reduce his sentence to time-served. Further, such determination falls squarely within the Commission's policy statement.

CR.RIS/DISPARITY. The Middle District of Florida granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Batura, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53805 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 16, 2026). In 2011, at the age of twenty, Batura robbed several fast-food restaurants using his father's gun. Batura pled guilty to offenses arising from two of the robberies, and he was sentenced to 385 months. Batura has changed and so has the law. Based on a change in the law, Batura requested a sentence reduction to 300 months, arguing he is serving an unusually long sentence. Batura relies on USSG 1B1.13(b)(6). There is an opportunity for relief under 1B1.13(b)(6) "where (a) the defendant is serving an unusually long sentence; (b) the defendant has served at least ten years of the sentence; and (c) an intervening change in the law has produced a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion is filed." He has never had a violent disciplinary infraction and has not had any disciplinary infractions in over four years. Batura's conduct while in custody weighs in favor of a finding that there are extraordinary and compelling reasons to reduce his sentence. Sentence reduced to 300 months.

CR.RIS/MEDICAL. The Western District of Washington granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Frick, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54160 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 16, 2026). Frick plead guilty to one count of Possession of Controlled Substances with Intent to Distribute and was sentenced to 120 months. Frick suffers from Crohn's disease, heart conditions, knee issues requiring joint replacement, a history of stroke, among other health conditions and his physical condition has seriously deteriorated, culminating in a stroke/heart attack. Frick submitted a declaration from Dr. Marc Stern, a prison medical expert, who has opined that FCI Terminal Island does not have adequate medical staff to give Frick the care he requires, that his serious and chronic medical conditions require long-term close monitoring and possible urgent or emergent care, and Frick has not received such care during his incarceration. Dr. Stern further indicates that without such care, Frick "is at risk of serious deterioration in health or death." The court found the Bureau of Prisons continues to be unable to adequately provide the medical care and treatment needed by Frick, and he established an extraordinary and compelling reason to grant his immediate release. Sentence reduced to time served.

APPEAL/922(g)(1). The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded United States v. Hostettler, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 8328 (6th Cir. Mar. 20, 2026). Defendant was found with a firearm while on supervised release, in violation of federal law prohibiting felons from possessing firearms. The conduct leading to the indictment included absconding from supervision and being discovered with a gun, which also violated the terms of his supervised release. He moved to dismiss the federal indictment, arguing the statute was unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to him, relying on recent Supreme Court decisions concerning the Second Amendment. The Northern District of Ohio granted the motion to dismiss, finding the relevant federal statute unconstitutional as applied to the defendant. The district court placed the burden on the Government to justify the restriction, considered only the defendant's felony convictions (not his entire criminal record), and did not account for his supervised release status. The government appealed. While the appeal was pending, the Sixth Circuit issued new precedent clarifying the proper standard for reviewing Second Amendment challenges. This precedent shifted the burden to the defendant to show he is not dangerous and required courts to consider the full criminal history and supervised release status. The Sixth Circuit determined the district court had not applied the correct legal standard and that the existing record was insufficient for an individualized dangerousness determination. The appellate court vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded for reconsideration of the motion to dismiss, instructing the district court to apply the correct legal standard consistent with current circuit precedent and to provide the defendant an opportunity to demonstrate he is not dangerous.

APPEAL/FSA TIME CREDITS. The Second Circuit vacated and remanded Rivera-Perez v. Stover, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 8819 (2d Cir. Mar. 26, 2026). A federal prisoner challenged the calculation of his earned time credits under the First Step Act by the Bureau of Prisons, arguing that the Bureau’s failure to properly apply these credits prevented his timely transfer from prison to prerelease custody. While the petition was pending, the prisoner was transferred to a residential reentry center, a form of prerelease custody, though he still had a significant number of unused credits. The Bureau had already used some credits to move up the start date of his supervised release, but the remaining credits were not applied. The District of Connecticut determined that, although his original request for transfer to prerelease custody was moot, the petition should be construed more broadly as requesting application of remaining time credits to reduce the length of his supervised release. The district court concluded the First Step Act required such credits to be used to shorten the prisoner’s supervised release and ordered the Bureau of Prisons to calculate and communicate the remaining credits for that purpose. The Second Circuit reviewed the case and held the relevant statutory provision, 18 USC 3632(d)(4)(C), allows earned time credits only to accelerate a prisoner’s move from incarceration to prerelease custody or to an earlier start of supervised release, but not to reduce the length of a term of supervised release itself. The court found that, once the prisoner was transferred to prerelease custody and his credits were applied to start supervised release early, his petition became moot. The Second Circuit therefore vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case as moot.

APPEAL/SENTENCE/MITIGATING ROLE. The First Circuit reversed and remanded United States v. Robles-Lopez, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 6427, 2026 WL 607315 (D. P.R. Mar. 4, 2026). The case involves a defendant who was recruited in Puerto Rico to act as a courier, transporting two suitcases containing approximately eleven kilograms of cocaine. Airport authorities in San Juan discovered the drugs before the defendant boarded the flight. After her arrest, she admitted to knowingly transporting the suitcases for a promised payment of $1,500, a sum far less than the drugs’ street value. Following her guilty plea to conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute cocaine, the court sentenced her to 48 months in prison and 48 months of supervised release. The Probation Office recommended a three-level reduction in her Sentencing Guidelines offense level based on her minor or minimal role, highlighting other individuals who recruited her, organized the transport, and prepared the luggage. The government objected, arguing she was indispensable to the offense. The district court agreed with the government and denied the mitigating-role reduction, focusing primarily on her own conduct and the fact she was the one transporting the drugs. The First Circuit reviewed whether the district court properly conducted the required comparative culpability analysis under the Sentencing Guidelines. The court held the district court erred by failing to consider the roles of all participants in the criminal activity and by not applying the multi-step analysis. The court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing so the district court could properly assess defendant’s eligibility for a mitigating-role reduction, consistent with current precedent and the proper legal framework.