SAMARITAN NEWSLETTER – 02.02.26
- russellmarks417
- Feb 20
- 7 min read
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SUPREME COURT/AEDPA/BRADY. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded Klein v. Martin, 2026 U.S. LEXIS 700, No. 25–51 (S. Ct. Jan. 26, 2026). A man was convicted in Maryland state court for the attempted murder of his girlfriend, who was shot in her apartment. The prosecution presented evidence including a homemade device that appeared to be a silencer and DNA evidence tying the defendant to that device. Witnesses testified about the defendant’s involvement in preparing the device and his motive, which stemmed from the girlfriend’s pregnancy and her threat to seek child support. Additional evidence linked the defendant to the type of firearm used in the shooting. The jury found the defendant guilty as an accessory before the fact, and he was sentenced to life in prison. After his conviction was affirmed on appeal, the defendant sought postconviction relief in Maryland state court, arguing the prosecution failed to disclose a forensic report about a laptop, which could have impeached a key witness’s testimony regarding the defendant’s online activity. The state postconviction court granted a new trial, but the Maryland Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding the undisclosed evidence was not material because the other evidence linking the defendant to the crime was strong enough there was no reasonable probability of a different outcome. The Maryland Court of Appeals denied review. The defendant sought federal habeas relief. The United States District Court granted his petition and a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed concluding that state court had not properly applied the correct standard for materiality under Brady v. Maryland. The Supreme Court reversed holding the state appellate court correctly applied the materiality standard and under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), federal courts must defer to reasonable state court decisions. The Supreme Court found that a fair minded jurist could conclude the withheld evidence was not material, and therefore federal habeas relief was not warranted.
SUPREME COURT/MVRA. The Court reversed and remanded Ellingburg v. United States, 2026 U.S. LEXIS 504, No. 24-482 (S. Ct. Jan. 20, 2026). The petitioner was convicted of a federal crime and after the enactment of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA) and was sentenced to pay $7,567.25 in restitution to his victim even though his criminal conduct occurred before the MVRA became law. The petitioner challenged the continued obligation to pay restitution arguing that applying the MVRA retroactively to his conduct violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. The District Court initially sentenced the petitioner under the MVRA. When the petitioner challenged the restitution order the Eighth Circuit found against him ruling that restitution under the MVRA is not criminal punishment and thus not subject to the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Eighth Circuit’s decision rested on its interpretation MVRA restitution was a civil remedy rather than a criminal penalty. The Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Eighth Circuit’s judgment. The Supreme Court held restitution imposed under the MVRA constitutes criminal punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Court explained the statutory text and structure as well as its placement in the criminal code and its role as a penalty imposed at sentencing demonstrate that restitution under the MVRA is penal in nature. The Court further noted that only criminal defendants can be ordered to pay restitution, it is imposed in criminal proceedings, and the Government, not the victim, is the adverse party. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its ruling allowing the Eighth Circuit to consider other arguments raised by the Government.
APPEAL/CR.RIS. The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded United States v. Ronald Hernandez, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 2170 (5th Cir. Jan. 28, 2026). Hernandez appealed the district court's denial of his motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 USC 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The district court failed to address arguments raised by Hernandez in his most recent motion and based its order on erroneous statements of the record. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's Order and remanded the case for additional proceedings.
CR.RIS/SEXUAL ABUSE/REHABILITATION. The District of Montana granted in part a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Stacy Weischedel, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16024 (D. Mont. Jan. 28, 2026). Weischedel filed a motion under 18 USC 3582(c)(1)(A) to reduce her three life sentences for armed carjacking and kidnapping which culminated in the murder of Peter Stucky. Weischedel invoked a change in the federal sentencing law, as reflected in the First Step Act of 2018 and USSG 1B1.13(b)(4)(A), as grounds for relief because she was repeatedly subjected to sexual abuse during her imprisonment. Weischedel's prison record shows she has had no serious incidents while incarcerated, successfully engaged in programing in multiple areas, and presents no threat to the public. Weischedel points to (1) the alleged sexual abuse committed by a Bureau of Prisons official, (2) her confinement at Dublin, and (3) her experience being transferred from Dublin to another facility. The Government did not address Weischedel's arguments regarding extraordinary and compelling circumstances. Weischedel's allegations regarding her treatment at Dublin are independently sufficient to satisfy 1B1.13(b)(5). Weischedel's sentence was reduced to 506 months of imprisonment.
CR.RIS/MEDICAL/FAMILY CIRCUMSTANCES. The District of Rhode Island granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Carlos Nevarez, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14582 (D. R.I. Jan. 27, 2026). Defendant entered pleas to charges of distributing cocaine, distribution of fentanyl, distribution of fentanyl 40 grams or more, possessing with intent to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl, and one count of possessing a firearm by a previously convicted individual. The Court sentenced him to the mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months. Nevarez's mother, Dalia Nevarez Santana, who is 63 years of age, suffered a severe stroke. She spent almost one month in the hospital, and at discharge her doctor noted that she was suffering from severe impairments that required use of a ventilator connected to a tracheal tube, and a gastro tube for nourishment. Nevarez's mother is incapacitated, and that evidence is unrefuted. Sentence reduced to time served.
CR.RIS/USSG 1B1.13(b)(6)/REHABILITATION. The Middle District of Florida granted in part a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Jaimie Buckalew, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12275 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 2026). The Court sentenced Buckalew to a mandatory 300-month term of imprisonment for possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, and possession of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime. He argued that compassionate release is appropriate because his 300-month sentence is longer than the sentence he would receive today and the gross disparity created by the First Step Act's Section 841 changes is precisely the sort of disparity the Sentencing Commission had in mind when it promulgated USSG 1B1.13(b)(6). He emphasized his rehabilitative efforts while in prison and his family support. Buckalew argues he has "shown exemplary rehabilitation while incarcerated," including completing his GED. The Court was troubled by Buckalew's multiple disciplinary infractions in prison, which contrast with his rehabilitation efforts. He committed three disciplinary infractions between Dec. 2019 and April 2020: "possessing a non-hazardous tool in Dec. 2019 (tattoo paraphernalia), phone abuse in Feb. 2020 (setting up a three-way call with his mother), and, most seriously, introduction of drugs/alcohol in April 2020 (attempting to smuggle K-2 into the institution)." Buckalew committed two additional infractions a little over a year ago in late 2024: possessing a non-hazardous tool (10 cigarettes) on Oct. 20, 2024, and giving or accepting money without authority (having his cellmate ask the cellmate's mother to transfer $55 into Buckalew's account) on Nov. 20, 2024. While these infractions are non-violent, they suggest that a longer period of incarceration than time-served is necessary. Sentence reduced to 211-months imprisonment.
CR.RIS/DISPARITY/STACKING/REHABILITATION/1B1.13(b)(6). The Eastern District of California granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Daniel Salinas, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11167 (E.D. Calif. Jan. 21, 2026). The defendant was charged by indictment with 10 counts of armed bank robbery or attempted armed bank robbery; and 10 counts of carrying a firearm during a crime of violence. Defendant was sentenced to 411 months. Defendant argued changes in the sentencing law—specifically, the effects of the First Step Act on 18 USC 924(c) mandatory minimums—presented "extraordinary and compelling reasons" to reduce his sentence under 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). He seeks relief under 1B1.13(b)(6). The Government did not dispute defendant satisfies the threshold requirements of 1B1.13(b)(6), including his 411-month sentence is unusually long and he has served more than 10 years, and the 20-year disparity between the sentence imposed and the sentence likely to be imposed today is gross. This disparity, together with the change in 924(c) sentencing law, defendant's 17 years of completed custody, his minimal criminal history, and his record of rehabilitation, the conclusion that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a reduction. Defendant has avoided violent disciplinary infractions, demonstrated sustained rehabilitation, and taken meaningful steps toward education and self-improvement. His institutional conduct, viewed over nearly two decades, reflects a significant departure from the behavior underlying his offenses. Sentence reduced to time served.
APPEAL/ACCA. The Eighth Circuit vacated and remanded United States v. Darrick Ferguson, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 24-2178 (8th Cir. Jan. 6, 2026). Ferguson pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. At the time of sentencing, Ferguson had three prior felony convictions, one of which was under Arkansas law for delivery of a controlled substance—specifically, cocaine. The district court determined all three prior convictions including the Arkansas drug conviction, qualified as predicate offenses for an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which mandates a minimum sentence for individuals with three or more prior convictions for “serious drug offenses.” Ferguson was sentenced to 180 months. The district court found Ferguson’s Arkansas conviction qualified as a serious drug offense under the ACCA and he contended the Arkansas statute under which he was convicted criminalizes a broader range of cocaine isomers than are covered by the federal Controlled Substances Act, therefore, his conviction should not count as a predicate offense for ACCA purposes. The Eighth Circuit applying the categorical approach held the Arkansas statute criminalizes all cocaine isomers while the federal law only covers specific ones. The Arkansas statute is broader and punishes conduct not included in the federal definition, his conviction does not qualify as a predicate offense under the ACCA. The Eighth Circuit vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing without ACCA enhancement.

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