SAMARITAN NEWSLETTER – 09-15-2025

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SUPREME COURT ORAL ARGUMENT SCHEDULE FOR OCTOBER 2025.

The Supreme Court’s oral argument calendar for October shows that 50% of the ten cases to be argued will present “pure” issues of constitutional criminal law: the Fourth Amendment’s protection from unreasonable searches (Case v. Montana, Oct. 15); the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy prohibition (Barrett v. United States, Oct. 7); the Sixth Amendment right to counsel (Villarreal v. Texas, Oct. 6); and protections found in Article I of the Constitution for the “Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus” (Bowe v. United States, Oct. 14); and against ex post facto punishments (Ellingburg v. United States, Oct. 14).

CR.RIS/DISPARITY/YOUTH/MEDICAL/REHABILITATION. The Eastern District of Virginia granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Johnny Wesley, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178403 (E.D. Va. Sept. 11, 2025). Wesley has served nearly 28 years in prison after his conviction for murder, and sentenced to life imprisonment. The defendant argued that his medical conditions are extraordinary and compelling reasons that warrant a reduction in his sentence; and that a variety of other factors in his case constitute "other reasons" for relief, including his (1) unusually long sentence (given current Sentencing Guidelines and his age at the time of the offenses) and (2) significant rehabilitation efforts. Defendant has serious health conditions: morbid obesity, hypertension, atrial fibrillation, deep vein thrombosis, hyperlipidemia, pulmonary embolus, stage three chronic kidney disease, sleep apnea, pressure ulcers, gout, anemia, and gastrointestinal reflux disease. The disparity between the defendant's sentence and the sentences his co-defendants served, coupled with a broad trend toward lower sentences for individuals convicted of murder, constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons to reduce the defendant's sentence from a term of life. This conclusion is bolstered by the defendant's youth at the time of his offenses and the rehabilitation he has achieved during the nearly three decades he has spent in prison. The defendant has demonstrated that the disparity that has developed over time among sentences for murder contributes to an extraordinary and compelling reason to reduce his sentence. The Fourth Circuit has never held that "a sentencing disparity alone is not enough to constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason to grant compassionate release." The defendant's age is an important factor in understanding the nature of the sentencing disparities presented in this case, which are independently extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release. The Court finds that the defendant's rehabilitation supports a finding of extraordinary and compelling other reasons to reduce his sentence to a term of years. As part of his sentence the court ordered defendant to pay $100,000 in restitution. Defendant has paid the entire amount, using money his mother left him when she died in 2021. The defendant's sentence was reduced to 480 months.

CR.RIS/DISPARITY/CAREER OFFENDER/USSG 1B1.13(b)(6). The Western District of Virginia granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Wilbert Hardy, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177529 (W.D. Va. Sept. 10, 2025). Hardy qualified as a career offender and the court sentenced him to 180 months for distribution of controlled substances. If sentenced today Hardy would no longer qualify as a career offender. Hardy claimed the disparity between the sentence imposed and the sentence others similarly situated would receive today constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason that warrants relief. Hardy's presentence report designated him as a career offender based on a "serious drug offense" selling cocaine, and the other for a "crime of violence" felony eluding police. Hardy asserted subsection (b)(6) applies to his case which requires he show (1) a "gross disparity" between the sentence he is serving, and the sentence likely to be imposed when he filed his motion for compassionate release, and (2) that he has served ten years of his sentence. The court found that subsection (b)(6) valid and applied to Hardy. Sentence reduced to time served.

CR.RIS/HALFWAY HOUSE PLACEMENT. The Southern District of Ohio granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Tracy Busch, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175615 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 9, 2025). A jury found defendant guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 USC 922(g)(1). He was sentenced to a term of 300 months. Defendant's sentence was enhanced because he was classified as an "armed career criminal." In preparation for his release from custody, his case manager requested a 365-day placement in a halfway house. Owing to a shortage of beds, he instead was offered 29 days in a halfway house in Columbus, Ohio, located more than 100 miles away from his home and family in Cincinnati. Defendant asks the Court to "modify [his] sentence and have the end of [his] time in a halfway house as part of [his] probation." Defendant set forth an "extraordinary and compelling" reason in support of release that is consistent with the Sentencing Commission's catch-all provision (found at USSG 1B1.13(b)(5)). Busch's term of incarceration was reduced to time served, with the first year of his supervised release to be served in a Residential Reentry Center ("RRC") in the Greater Cincinnati area.

CR.RIS/FAMILY CIRCUMSTANCES. The District of Minnesota granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Ryan Dibley, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174138 (D. Minn. Sept. 8, 2025). Dibley pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and cocaine and was sentenced to 146-months. Dibley argued he should be released because his minor daughter, A.D., needs a caretaker. Dibley's sister is A.D.'s guardian. His sister has a mass in her bladder that needs to be removed. She is currently scheduled for surgery on Sept. 25, 2025. Following surgery, she will be unable to care for A.D. The length of her recovery is currently unknown because of the potential for complications. She has been forced to cancel the surgery in the past because she was unable to find anyone to care for A.D. Her doctors have emphasized the need for this surgery and that she should not put it off any longer. No other family members are available to care for A.D. while Dibley's sister undergoes and recovers from surgery. The court found these circumstances to be extraordinary and compelling. Sentence reduced to time served.

CR.RIS/MEDICAL. The District of New Hampshire granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Steve Huard, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175109 (D. N.H. Sept. 8, 2025). Defendant sought early compassionate release from his 360-month sentence. The Government conceded defendant's current "medical conditions in combination with his age and assaults he has experienced while in custody create extraordinary and compelling reasons for [early] release." Defendant suffers from debilitating and potentially fatal medical conditions (AIDS; COPD; severe back pain) requiring him to use a walker, have a continuous source of supplemental oxygen, and obtain assistance from others with regard to the normal activities of daily life. He is not expected to recover. In supplemental declarations filed at the court's request the court found that defendant's medical conditions are severe, fatal, debilitating, degenerative and permanent. Defendant has shown extraordinary and compelling reasons that warrant a sentence reduction. Defendant's sentence was reduced to time-served.

APPEAL/922(g)(1). The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded United States v. Joshua Gaines, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 22405 (11th Cir. Sept. 10, 2025).

Gaines pled guilty in Alabama state court to receiving stolen property in the third degree, a Class D felony under Alabama law. Due to his criminal history, Alabama statutes at the time prohibited the court from sentencing him to any actual prison time for this offense. Gaines received a 24-month suspended sentence and was placed on probation for two years, with the possibility of community corrections or other non-prison alternatives, but no incarceration in a prison or jail. After his conviction, Gaines was notified federal law prohibited him from possessing a firearm. Six months later, he was found in possession of a gun and admitted ownership. The Northern District of Alabama tried Gaines on two counts: possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year in violation of 18 USC 922(g)(1), and possession of an unregistered firearm. After the government rested, Gaines moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that his prior conviction did not meet the federal statute’s requirement. The district court denied the motion, and the jury convicted him on the 922(g)(1) count but acquitted him on the other. Gaines was sentenced to 51 months. The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and held 922(g)(1) requires a defendant-specific inquiry: the statute applies only if the defendant was actually subject to a sentence of more than one year of imprisonment in a prison or jail. Because Alabama law precluded any prison time for Gaines’s offense, his conviction did not qualify. The Eleventh Circuit vacated Gaines’s conviction and remanded with instructions to grant his motion for judgment of acquittal.

APPEAL/RESENTENCE. The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded United States v. Keast, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 23380 (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 2025). The defendant pled guilty in federal court to being a felon in possession of a firearm. At the time of sentencing, he had a prior Oregon felony conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, specifically under the “possession” subsection of the Oregon statute, with an added firearm enhancement. The key issue at sentencing was whether this prior conviction qualified as a “crime of violence” under the federal Sentencing Guidelines. The District of Oregon determined the prior Oregon conviction did qualify as a crime of violence under USSG 4B1.2(a)(1). This finding increased defendant’s base offense level and resulted in a higher recommended sentencing range. The district court imposed a sentence of 46 months, which was below the enhanced guideline range but above what it would have been without the crime-of-violence enhancement. The defendant appealed arguing the district court’s analysis was incorrect. The Ninth Circuit held the Oregon statutes at issue does not require, as an element, the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another. The court found neither the underlying offense nor the firearm enhancement statute required such an element, and the government’s arguments to the contrary were not supported by the statutory text or Oregon case law. The Ninth Circuit concluded the prior conviction was not a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines. The court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing without the crime-of-violence enhancement.