SAMARITAN NEWSLETTER – 09-02-2025

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CRIMINAL CASES ON SUPREME COURT FALL DOCKET

Barrett v. United States, Case No. 24-5774 (argument Oct. 7) asking whether the 5th Amendment double jeopardy clause permits two sentences for a single act that violates both 18 USC 924(c) and 924(j).

Ellingburg v. United States, Case No. 24-482 (argument Oct. 14) asking whether criminal restitution under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act is penal (punishment) for purposes of the Constitution’s ex post facto clause.

Rico v. United States, Case No. 24-1056 (argument Nov. 3) asking whether the fugitive-tolling doctrine – which holds that criminal defendants should not receive credit toward prison sentences for time that they have escaped – should be extended to cases where the defendant absconds from supervised release.

Rutherford v. United States, Case No. 24-820 (argument Nov.12) and Fernandez v. United States, Case No. 24-556 (argument Nov. 12). Rutherford, brought by a defendant serving stacked 924(c) sentences of 32 years for carrying a gun in two robberies, asks whether a district court may consider disparities created by the First Step Act’s prospective changes in sentencing law – such as destacking 924(c) punishments – when deciding if “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant a “compassionate release” sentence reduction under 18 USC 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Fernandez is similar, asking whether a combination of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that may warrant compassionate release can include reasons that may include grounds that could be raised to set aside a sentence under 28 USC 2255.

CR.RIS/DISPARITY/REHABILITATION/STACKING. The Southern District of Florida granted in part a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Kadeem Willingham, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165154 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2025). Defendant pled guilty to violating two counts of 18 USC 924(c). These charges stemmed from defendant's commission of five armed robberies. The Court sentenced defendant to a total sentence of 384 months. Defendant asked the Court to reduce his sentence to time served. As grounds, he relies both on the "unusually long sentence" provision of the Sentencing Commission's policy statement governing compassionate release and the "other reasons" provision. USSG 1B1.13(b)(5) & (b)(6)). Defendant’s reasons for reduction of his sentence are: (1) his relative youth—22 years old—at the time of the offenses; (2) his lack of criminal history; (3) his traumatic childhood; (4) the sentencing disparity between defendant and his co-defendants; and (5) defendant's rehabilitation. The Court had little difficulty concluding that defendant's sentence is unusually long. Defendant also established an extraordinary and compelling reason to modify his sentence under the more flexible standard of 1B1.13(b)(5). Importantly, 1B1.13(b)(5) does not require that a defendant present "other reasons" that are similar in nature to those listed in (b)(1)-(4), "[r]ather, it states that 'other reasons' are to be 'similar in gravity.'" Most significant are: (1) defendant's young age at the time he committed his crimes; (2) his lack of criminal history; (3) his traumatic childhood; and (4) his rehabilitative efforts. Defendant's youth, lack of criminal history, and childhood abuse were "fully disclosed in the PSI and considered at the time of sentencing," did not preclude the Court from considering these factors in the context of the instant Motion. Sentence reduced to 180-months.

APPEAL/CR.RIS. The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded United States v. James Riani, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 21556 (11th Cir. Aug. 22, 2025). Riani appealed the district court's denial of his motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 USC 3582(c)(1)(A) based on extraordinary and compelling circumstances due to his incarceration during the COVID-19 pandemic and his progress in rehabilitation. A district court may grant compassionate release if: (1) an extraordinary and compelling reason exists; (2) a sentencing reduction would be consistent with USSG 1B1.13 because the defendant's release would not endanger the community; and (3) the 3553(a) factors weigh in favor of compassionate release. When the district court finds that one of these three prongs is not met, it need not examine the other prongs. The court concluded the district court abused its discretion in denying Riani's motion for a sentence reduction because it incorrectly construed Riani's motion as seeking relief under 3582(c)(2) instead of 3582(c)(1)(A) and analyzed his motion under the wrong standard in determining he was ineligible for relief. The court vacated the district court's order and remanded for the district court to consider Riani's motion under the correct standard for a motion seeking a sentence reduction under 3582(c)(1)(A).

APPEAL/3582(c)(2). The Third Circuit affirmed United States v. Paul Harmon, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 20655 (3d Cir. Aug. 14, 2025). Harmon pled guilty in 2021 to one count of wire fraud. In 2024, he moved under 18 USC 3582(c)(2) for a sentence reduction because of a new, retroactive section of the Sentencing Guidelines, USSG 4C1.1. The District Court, relying on a victim impact statement from the initial sentencing, denied the motion on the ground Harmon's crimes had caused substantial financial hardship to his victims. It offered Harmon no opportunity to challenge the facts in the statement at the motion-for-sentence-reduction stage. He appealed contending the Court's reliance on that statement violated his due-process rights. The court held that USSG 6A1.3(a), which outlines due-process protections for sentencing, applies to the consideration of motions for sentence reduction under 18 USC 3582(c)(2). Put simply, defendants must be "given notice of and an opportunity to contest new information relied on by the district court in a 3582(c)(2) proceeding." The Third Circuit held that USSG 6A1.3(a), which outlines due process protections for sentencing, also applies to the consideration of motions for sentence reduction under 18 USC 3582(c)(2). The Circuit ruled defendants have a due process right not to be sentenced based on invalid premises or inaccurate information. While defendants have fewer rights in sentence-reduction proceedings than at initial sentencings, basic due process protections still apply where the information is “new.” Information is “new” when it is relied on for the first time to find material facts. This definition ensures defendants have an opportunity to contest information when it matters under the law. But in Harmon’s case, the victim impact statement was not “new information” because Harmon knew of it at sentencing, where it was relevant to the 3553(a) sentencing factors, and he had reason and opportunity to dispute it. The 3rd Circuit noted that the 5th, 7th, 8th and 11th Circuits agree with it, but the 9th has held that USSG 6A1.3(a) does not apply on sentence reduction motions.

APPEAL/18 USC 922(g)(3). The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded United States v. Harrison, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 21978 (10th Cir. Aug. 26, 2025).

A man was stopped by police in Lawton, Oklahoma, for a traffic violation. During the stop, officers smelled marijuana and, after searching his car, found a loaded revolver and various marijuana products. The man did not have a medical marijuana card and was arrested on state charges for marijuana possession, paraphernalia, and a traffic offense. Subsequently, a federal grand jury indicted him for violating 18 USC 922(g)(3), which prohibits firearm possession by anyone who is an unlawful user of or addicted to a controlled substance. The Western District of Oklahoma granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The district court found that the Second Amendment’s text covered the defendant’s conduct and held that applying 922(g)(3) to non-intoxicated marijuana users was inconsistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court reasoned that historical regulations only permitted disarming those who had acted dangerously in the past, not those merely believed to pose a risk of future danger. The government appealed this decision. The Tenth Circuit held United States v. Rahimi clarified the methodology for Second Amendment challenges, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the historical tradition supports disarming individuals believed to pose a risk of future danger, not just those who have acted dangerously before. However, the appellate court found that the Government must show that non-intoxicated marijuana users pose such a risk. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the Government can meet this burden.

APPEAL/SUPERVISED RELEASE/DETENTION. The Second Circuit vacated and remanded United States v. Luis Fernandez, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 21622 (2d Cir. Aug. 25, 2025). Carlos Mercado was originally convicted in federal court of conspiracy to distribute heroin and sentenced to 120 months followed by five years of supervised release. After completing his prison term, Mercado began supervised release in June 2021. In Nov. 2024, he was arrested by Hartford police and charged under Connecticut law with drug offenses after narcotics and cash were found in his possession. The Probation Office petitioned the district court to issue a summons for a hearing on Mercado’s alleged violation of supervised release. The district court questioned whether it had statutory authority to detain Mercado pending revocation proceedings, citing the Non-Detention Act, which requires statutory authorization for detention of U.S. citizens. The court concluded that neither 18 USC 3143(a)(1) nor Rule 32.1 provided such authority, reasoning that Mercado had not been “found guilty of an offense” with respect to the alleged violation and was not “awaiting imposition or execution” of a sentence. The court denied the Government’s motion to detain Mercado, and Mercado moved to dismiss the Government’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Second Circuit held it had jurisdiction to review the district court’s order under 18 USC 3145(c) and 28 USC 1291. The Second Circuit further held 18 USC 3143(a)(1) authorizes a district court to detain a supervisee charged with a supervised release violation pending revocation proceedings, because the supervisee was previously found guilty and is awaiting execution of a portion of the original sentence. The appellate court vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings.