SAMARITAN NEWSLETTER – 07-22-2025

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CR.RIS/FAMILY CIRCUMSTANCES/USSG 1B1.13(b)(5). The Eastern District of North Carolina granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Antonio Lynch, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134584 (E.D. N.C. July 15, 2025). Defendant was charged with committing four counts of Hobbs Act Robbery within the span of four days. Pursuant to a written plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to two of those counts. On Dec. 1, 2020, the court sentenced him to a total term of 120 months. He sought his immediate release from federal custody or the commutation of his sentence to home confinement, arguing his minor children's placement into foster care and the lack of other family members who could serve as a custodian constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for relief. Defendant argued his need to serve as his children's primary caregiver is an extraordinary and compelling reason for relief and the court agreed. Indeed, USSG 1B1.13(b)(5) provides that extraordinary and compelling reason may exist when "[t]he defendant presents any other circumstance or combination of circumstances," whether "considered by themselves or together with any of the reasons described in paragraphs (1) through (4)," so long as they are "similar in gravity." See id. (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that a significant sentence disparity between co-defendants warranted relief under the First Step Act). In sum, though the circumstances presented do not neatly fall within the Guideline's "family circumstances" policy statement, the court retains the discretion to determine whether they are sufficiently analogous to warrant relief. Sentence reduced to time served.

CR/RIS/USSG 1B1.13(b)(6). The Southern District of Florida granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. David Sears, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132643 (S.D. Fla. July 10, 2025). Defendant was convicted of one count of conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 USC 846 (Count 1); one count of maintaining a place for the purpose of using or distributing controlled substances in violation of 21 USC 856(a)(1) (Count 2); one count of possession with the intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 USC 841(a)(1) (Count 4); one count of conspiracy to launder money in violation of 18 USC 1956(h) (Count 5) and one count of money laundering in violation of 18 USC 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and (B)(1) (Count 6). The Government filed an information pursuant to 21 USC 851 seeking enhanced punishment. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment on Counts 1 and 4, and 240 months of imprisonment on Counts 2, 5 and 6, all terms to run concurrently. Defendant moved the Court for a reduction in his sentence pursuant to 18 USC 3582(c)(1)(A) and USSG 1B1.13(b)(5) and (b)(6). Defendant would not be subject to a mandatory life sentence on Count 1, but rather a mandatory sentence on Count 1 of 25 years of imprisonment. Drug offenders who have been convicted of similar offenses with similar criminal histories rarely receive more than 360 months of imprisonment The Court found that receiving a mandatory life sentence in comparison to a mandatory 25 year sentence is both an unusually long sentence and it produces a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time defendant filed his motion. The Court reduced defendant's sentence on Count 1 and 4 of the Indictment to 324 months of imprisonment to be served concurrently. Defendant's sentence as to Counts 2, 5 and 6 shall remain at 240 months to run concurrently with Counts 1 and 4 and concurrently with each other.

CR.RIS/MEDICAL/REHABILITATION/DISPARITY. The District of Maryland granted in part a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Harris, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126597 (D. Md. July 3, 2025). In 2004 Harris was sentenced to fifty years of imprisonment for multiple armed bank robberies. In a previous compassionate releasee motion the court granted the motion, in part, and reduced defendant's sentence to 30 years of imprisonment. In defendant's Compassionate Release Motion, he details new and exacerbated medical problems following his COVID-19 infection in Dec. 2020, including sharp pains in his kidneys, high blood pressure, and dizzy spells. Harris recounts that he ran out of several of his prescriptions but was unable to order a refill because the institution was on lockdown. When he met with his health service provider, he informed her that he was out of his medication and that he had "been having dizzy spells and minor sharp pains in [his] side," which meant he "knew [his] blood pressure was/is high." But, Harris claimed because he did not previously place a refill order, the provider told him she would only provide one week's worth of one of his prescriptions. His kidney disease "has clearly degenerated since 2020," from stage 2 to stage 3a. In determining whether a conviction is expunged for the purposes of USSG 4A1.2(j), "[t]he majority of Courts of Appeals to consider the issue have found that 'expungement within the meaning of the Guidelines's structure is best determined by considering whether the conviction was set aside because of innocence or errors of law.'" A conviction is considered expunged when "calculating criminal history points only if it was expunged pursuant to 'constitutional invalidity, innocence, or errors of law.'" Harris has certainly made efforts to rehabilitate himself. The court concluded a sentence reduction of 12 months was warranted; a total sentence of 29-years is "sufficient, but not greater than necessary" to comply with the purposes of incarceration.

CR.RIS/SECTION 404 OF THE FIRST STEP ACT. The Western District of Virginia granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Rishi Robertson, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126487 (W.D. Va. July 2, 2025). Robertson was sentenced in 2008 on his conviction for possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 USC 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). At sentencing, his guideline range was determined to be 70-87 months, and the court sentenced him to 72 months. He was released from custody in Jan. 2012 and began his five-year supervised release term. On Jan. 2014, after Robertson pled guilty to a single count of distribution of cocaine and the court sentenced him to 151 months. On the same date—and based on the same conduct underlying his 151-month sentence—the court found that Robertson had violated his supervised release term in the 2007 case. The court calculated the guideline range as 24-38 months, and varied downward, imposing a 12-month sentence for the violation, to be served consecutive to the 151-month sentence. The Fourth Circuit held a district court could reduce a defendant's revocation sentence pursuant to Section 404 of the First Step Act where the district court imposed the original sentence under the pre-2010 sentencing guidelines and the defendant subsequently violated his supervised release conditions, even if the violation occurred after 2010. The court reasoned that the revocation sentence is considered part of the defendant's original sentence under the unitary sentencing framework. Robertson suffered a traumatic experience as a young teen, when he was robbed at gunpoint, and that he suffered from learning disabilities and a low IQ, received special education throughout school, and did not graduate nor receive a GED at any point before the 2013 case. He has struggled with substance abuse since his teens. Significantly the court believed he had shown excellent rehabilitation efforts while in prison, which included an unblemished disciplinary record throughout his service of a lengthy sentence. Sentence reduced to time served.

APPEAL/18 USC 922(g)(3). The Third Circuit vacated and remanded United States v. Erik Harris, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 17293 (3d Cir. July 14, 2025), Harris, a frequent marijuana user, purchased three pistols over a short period. Each time, he falsely stated on federal forms that he was not an unlawful user of marijuana. After losing one of the guns while intoxicated, Harris reported it stolen and bought a replacement. When the missing gun was found with a felon, Harris admitted to regular marijuana use during police questioning. The Western District of Pennsylvania denied Harris's motion to dismiss the charges which included three counts under 18 USC 922(g)(3) for possessing guns as an unlawful drug user and three counts under 922(a)(6) for lying to obtain the guns. The court concluded 922(g)(3) was constitutional as applied to Harris, using means-end scrutiny. Harris pled guilty to all counts but preserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. The Third Circuit held that history and tradition justify 922(g)(3)’s restrictions on those who pose a special danger of misusing firearms due to frequent drug use. However, the court found insufficient facts to determine whether the law's restrictions are constitutional as applied to Harris. The court affirmed the statute's constitutionality in general but vacated Harris's conviction under 922(g)(3) and remanded the case for further fact-finding. The court also held that 922(g)(3) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Harris and upheld his convictions under 922(a)(6) for lying on the federal forms.

APPEAL/ERROR CORAM NOBIS. The Second Circuit vacated and remanded Mark Johnson v. United States, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 17684 (2d Cir. July 17, 2025). Johnson was convicted of wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud in 2017. The charges stemmed from a 2011 transaction where HSBC, under Johnson's leadership, converted U.S. dollars into British pounds for Cairn Energy. The government presented two theories of fraud to the jury: the now-invalid right-to-control theory and the misappropriation theory. Johnson filed a Petition for a writ of coram nobis after the Supreme Court's decision in Ciminelli v. United States invalidated the right-to-control theory. The Eastern District of New York dismissed Johnson's Petition, concluding that the jury would have convicted him under the valid misappropriation theory, rendering the inclusion of the invalid right-to-control theory harmless. Johnson appealed this decision. The Second Circuit found that the government's case under the misappropriation theory was weak and expressed grave doubt that the presentation of the right-to-control theory was harmless. The court noted that the misappropriation theory required proving a fiduciary relationship between Johnson and Cairn, which was not clearly established, and that Johnson misused confidential information, which was also not convincingly demonstrated. The Second Circuit held that the inclusion of the invalid right-to-control theory was not harmless and that the jury was likely influenced by it. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for entry of an order granting Johnson's Petition for a writ of coram nobis.