SAMARITAN NEWSLETTER – 10-06- 2025
- russellmarks417
- Oct 9
- 6 min read
SAMARITAN PROJECTS
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CR.RIS/DISPARITY/USSG 1B1.13(b)(6). The Middle District of Florida granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Enrique Borja-Antunes, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196496 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 3, 2025). In 2011, a jury found Borja-Antunes guilty of one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 or more grams of methamphetamine under 21 USC 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846; and one count of possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine under 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 18 USC 2. Borja-Antunes had two prior convictions for "serious drug felonies"—one in 1992 and another in 1995—the Court sentenced him to life as then mandated by 21 USC 841(b)(1)(A). The Court ordered the sentence be served consecutively to the 63-month sentence imposed on April 6, 2011, for illegal reentry after prior deportation. Much has changed since Borja-Antunes's 2011 sentencing. In 2018, Congress enacted the First Step Act which redefined a "serious drug felony" in relevant part as an offense involving the manufacture, distribution, or possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance for which the defendant "served a term of imprisonment of more than 12 months" and was released from that term of imprisonment "within fifteen years of the commencement of the instant offense. The Act also reduced mandatory minimum sentences for convictions under 841(b). Now, a defendant with a single prior qualifying serious drug felony conviction is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years imprisonment. Borja-Antunes sought compassionate release arguing he is serving an "unusually long sentence," which the Sentencing Commission classifies as an "extraordinary and compelling reason" for a sentence reduction. USSG 1B1.13(b)(6). Obviously, Borja-Antunes's life sentence is "unusually long." And Borja-Antunes has already served eleven years of that sentence. Finally, "an intervening change in the law has produced a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion is filed." 1B1.13(b)(6). Thus, all three of the 1B1.13(b)(6) conditions are satisfied. Since being incarcerated, Borja-Antunes has earned a "Bible Studies diploma" and "an exercise certification," and he has completed a drug abuse education course. Sentence reduced to 180-months imprisonment.
CR.RIS/USSG 1B1.13(b)(6). The Southern District of New York granted in part a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Wallace, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194852 (S.D. N.Y. Oct. 1, 2025). Wallace moved for a reduction in sentence for extraordinary and compelling reasons pursuant to 18 USC 3582(c)(1)(A) and USSG 1B1.13(b)(6). He was convicted at trial of one count of being a felon in possession of firearm and ammunition and received a sentence of 180 months imprisonment. Wallace asserted he received the 15-year mandatory sentence because he was found to be qualified for an enhanced sentence under the ACCA. Wallace argued that because one of his prior convictions no longer qualifies as an ACCA predicate offense, he would not be subjected to a 15-year mandatory minimum if sentenced today. The Government agreed in part that he would not be subject to the ACCA-related enhancements because his 1998 conviction for attempted criminal sale of a controlled substance would no longer qualify as a "serious drug felony" under ACCA. Wallace's BOP disciplinary records were a cause for concern about future conduct. A 14-page report identifies what appears to be over 40 separate incidents, some with multiple charges. In 2024 alone, the charges range from assaulting an inmate with closed fists, possessing a 5.5-inch sharpened plastic weapon, fighting with inmates, and disruptive behavior. Wallace stated that "while he is guilty of some [of] the disciplinary violations . . . most of the disciplinary violations he was framed of committing [sic]." The Court reduced Wallace's term of imprisonment from 180 months to 144 months imprisonment and increased his term of supervised release from one year to three years
CR.RIS/USSG 1B1.13(b)(6). The Eastern District of California granted the CR.RIS recommendation of the Magistrate’s Judge in United States v. Derek Maddox, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192340 (E.D. Calif. Sept. 29, 2025). On Aug, 12, 2025, the magistrate judge filed findings and recommendations herein which were served on petitioner and which contained notice to petitioner that any objections to the findings and recommendations were to be filed within fourteen days. No party has filed objections to the findings and recommendations. In accordance with the provisions of 28 USC 636(b)(1)(C) and Local Rule 304, the court conducted a de novo review of the case. Having carefully reviewed the entire file, the court found the findings and recommendations to be supported by the record and by proper analysis. Defendant's motion for reduction in sentence was granted, and his sentence was reduced to time served. Defendant and other men robbed the Financial Center Credit Union in Manteca, and he was charged with armed credit union robbery and use of a firearm. Defendant was sentenced to 262 months imprisonment on the robbery count and 84 months on the firearm count, to be served consecutively, for a total of 346 months imprisonment. Defendant argued that the length of his sentence – particularly the alleged disparity in between his sentence and the sentence that would be imposed on a similar defendant today – constitutes an extraordinary and compelling circumstance that should be sufficient to reduce his sentence. In so arguing, defendant relied on USSG 1B1.13(b)(6), which permits consideration of an unusually long sentence when analyzing whether a reduction in sentence is appropriate. The Government acknowledged that defendant’s state robbery convictions would no longer be considered crimes of violence for federal sentencing purposes, and defendant would not be sentenced as a career offender if he were sentenced today. Defendant’s efforts in prison, along with statements of BOP staff, strongly suggest defendant is committed to rehabilitation. In sum, defendant demonstrated a change in the law that produced a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed if he were being sentenced at the time he filed this motion. That change constitutes an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for a sentence reduction. Sentence reduced to time served.
APPEAL/RESTITUTION. The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded United States v. James Michael Wells, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 24974 (9th Cir. Sept. 26, 2025). The defendant, a former U.S. Coast Guard employee, was convicted by a jury of murdering two co-workers in Alaska. At the time of the Government’s collection action, he held approximately $450,000 in a Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) account, a federal retirement savings plan. His wife had a statutory right to a joint and survivor annuity from the account, and federal law generally requires spousal consent for lump-sum withdrawals. Following his conviction, the Government sought to collect the entire balance of his TSP account as restitution for the victims’ families. The District of Alaska initially ordered restitution from the defendant’s retirement and disability income, including his TSP funds, but limited lump-sum withdrawals from the TSP without spousal consent, instead permitting monthly payments. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated the restitution order, holding that the district court could not use the All Writs Act to bypass statutory garnishment limits and remanded for a determination of whether the defendant’s benefit streams constituted “earnings” subject to a 25% garnishment cap under the Consumer Credit Protection Act. On remand, the district court issued amended restitution orders authorizing the Government to collect the entire TSP account balance as a lump sum. The defendant appealed, arguing that statutory spousal protections limited the Government to periodic garnishments. The Ninth Circuit held that the Government may only cash out a defendant’s TSP account to satisfy a restitution order under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act if the plan’s terms would allow the defendant to do so at the time of the order. Because spousal consent was required and not obtained, the court vacated the restitution orders and remanded for further proceedings.
APPEAL/ACCA. The Tenth Circuit vacated and remanded for resentencing United States v. Michael Campbell, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 25277 (10th Cir. Sept. 30, 2025). Late one night, a homeowner called 911 to report that her security camera showed a Black man and woman taking items from her back porch. Within minutes, a police officer arrived and encountered Campbell near the reported location. Campbell claimed to live at the residence and was uncooperative with the officer’s instructions, repeatedly dropping his hands and reaching for his wallet despite being told not to. The officer noticed what appeared to be a gun magazine in Campbell’s waistband and, after a brief exchange, frisked Campbell, discovering a firearm and a knife. Campbell was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The Western District of Oklahoma denied Campbell’s motion to suppress the firearm, finding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain and frisk Campbell and that this suspicion had not dissipated before the frisk. Campbell was convicted at trial. At sentencing, the district court determined that Campbell’s five prior Oklahoma armed robbery convictions qualified as violent felonies under the ACCA subjecting him to a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence. Campbell was sentenced to 240 months, above the statutory maximum for the felon-in-possession offense but below the Guidelines range. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion and upheld the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession statute. However, the Tenth Circuit held that Oklahoma armed robbery can be committed with a reckless state of mind and therefore does not categorically qualify as a violent felony under the ACCA’s elements clause. The court vacated Campbell’s sentence and remanded for resentencing, while affirming his conviction.

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