The Law Office of Tom Norrid
SAMARITAN PROJECTS LLC
P.O. Box 9244
Springfield, MO 65801-9244
The SAMARITAN-PROJECT prepares post-conviction and compassionate release motions under the direction of Attorney Tom Norrid. The Project retrieves documents at reasonable prices. The Project newsletter reports every winning published district court and court of appeals case for the week in review.
CR.RIS/USSG 1B.1.13(b)(6). The District of Kansas granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Robert Guzman, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25737 (D. Kan. Feb. 12, 2025). Guzman pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 USC 846, and one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 USC 841(a)(1). Guzman was sentenced to a term of 327 months. Guzman received an unusually long sentence and he has served 10 years of that sentence, and a change in the law produced a gross disparity between the sentence that was actually imposed and the one that likely would be imposed today. USSG 1B1.13(b)(6). The sentencing framework under which Guzman was sentenced no longer applies, and if Guzman were sentenced today, he would not qualify as a career offender. Guzman's receipt of a long sentence under the Sentencing Commission's policy statement in 1B1.13(b)(6), and Guzman's unique circumstances all point to extraordinary and compelling reasons that warrant a sentence reduction. Sentence reduced to time served.
CR.RIS/REHABILITATION/DISPARITY/STACKING/YOUTH/USSG 1B1.13(b)(6). The Western District of Kentucky granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Robert Aguon, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22399 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 7, 2025). A jury convicted Aguon of two counts of aiding and abetting a bank robbery, two counts of placing lives in jeopardy, and two counts of carrying a firearm during a crime of violence. Aguon was sentenced to 438 months. Aguon argued his sentencing is unusually long, as well as personal rehabilitation, youth at the time of the offense, and family and community support. The question is whether the change in law produced "a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence" Aguon would receive today such that his sentence is "unusually long." Aguon would be subject to a 16.5-year sentence, not a 36.5-year sentence. A 20-year difference in sentence amounts to a gross disparity under 1B1.13(b)(6). Aguon's young age at the time he committed these offenses is not a new development. Aguon's young age at the time of the offense may be considered in combination with other factors. While rehabilitation by itself cannot serve as independent reason for compassionate release, it can be considered in concert with other circumstances. Aguon's unusually long sentence is grossly disparate when compared to the sentence he would receive today. This combined with his young age at the time of the offense, family and community support, and rehabilitative efforts, demonstrate extraordinary and compelling circumstances supporting reducing his sentence. The Court reduced Aguon's sentence from 36.5 years to time-served.
CR.RIS/REHABILILTATION/AGE/DISPARITY/USSG 1B1.13(b)(6)/YOUTH. The Western District of Kentucky granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Maurice Brooks, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22409 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 7, 2025). Brooks moved the Court to reduce his sentence under 18 USC 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) due to his sentence being an unusually long, his age at the time of his crime, his character, rehabilitation, sincere remorse and contribution, lack of danger to the community, and he is the only available caregiver to his brother. Brooks was convicted of bank robbery and ten counts of using firearms during the commission of those robberies in violation of 18 USC 924(c). Brooks was sentenced to 2722 months which was later reduced to 2242 months. Brooks argued he was serving an "unusually long sentence" because his 18 USC 924(c) offenses for possessing a firearm were "stacked." Today, Brooks would be subject to a 67-year sentence, not a 186-year sentence. A 119-year difference in sentence amounts to a gross disparity under 1B1.13(b)(6). Brooks' young age at the time of the offense may be considered in combination with other factors. While rehabilitation by itself cannot serve as independent reason for compassionate release, it can be considered in concert with other circumstances. Brooks unusually long sentence is grossly disparate when compared to the sentence he would receive today. This combined with his young age at the time of the offense, and rehabilitative efforts, demonstrate extraordinary and compelling circumstances supporting reducing his sentence. The Court reduced Brooks' sentence from 186 years to 48 years.
CR.RIS/HARSH CONDITIONS/MEDICAL/REHABILITATION. The District of Rhode Island granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Joshua Souza, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22349 (D. R.I. Feb. 7, 2025). The Court sentenced Souza to 10 years after he pled guilty to possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Souza asked the Court to reduce his sentence by 24 months-from 120 months to 96 months. He based his request on extraordinary harsh conditions at his facility, medical and family issues, and his record of rehabilitation. The extraordinary difficult conditions at FCI Allenwood Medium. Staffing-shortage-caused lockdowns (". . . he has spent much of the year locked in his cell because of devastating staffing shortages at FCI Allenwood/ Medium"). On weekends, inmates were not able to leave their cells. Visitors were being turned away because of staffing shortages. His medical condition, including a serious gastro-intestinal issue which he asserted was not being adequately addressed. ("Dr. Cullen did speak with staff member and offered his apology."). His extraordinary work at bettering himself while incarcerated and attesting to his rehabilitation (e.g., 200-hour plumbers apprenticeship program). His family support awaiting him. The Court found that a combination of circumstances unique to Souza evidence extraordinary and compelling reasons to grant Sousa a reduced sentence. The Court reduced the 120-month sentence to 96-months.
APPEAL/ACCA. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded United States v. Quincy Taylor, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 2868 (6th Cir. Feb. 7, 2025). A jury convicted Quincy Taylor of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Taylor challenged the district court’s limitation of his cross-examination of one of the Government’s witnesses under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Taylor argued the district court violated his due-process and jury-trial rights by not requiring the jury to find that he committed certain prior offenses on different occasions for purposes of determining whether the ACCA should have applied to him. Because the court’s cross-examination limitations violated Taylor’s constitutional right to confrontation and were not harmless, the court reversed Taylor’s convictions and remanded for a new trial.
APPEAL/EVIDENCE. The Sixth Circuit remanded United States v. Thomas Weir, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 3468 (6th Cir. Feb. 12, 2025). Defendant allegedly conspired to recruit patients and distribute medically unnecessary prescription opioids at two pharmacies in rural Tennessee. As a result, a federal grand jury indicted them for various drug-conspiracy and healthcare-fraud charges. Before trial the district court excluded evidence related to defendant William Donaldson’s prior federal and state convictions involving the distribution and possession of opioids, as well as defendant Pamela Spivey’s prior complaint to the Tennessee Board of Pharmacy detailing allegations of her co-defendants unprofessional prescribing practices. The Government challenged those evidentiary rulings in this interlocutory appeal. The court affirmed the district court’s exclusion of Donaldson’s federal convictions and Spivey’s complaint, reversed the district court’s exclusion of Donaldson’s state conviction, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
APPEAL/922(g)(1). The Third Circuit vacated and remanded George Pitsilides v. Barr, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 3007 (3d Cir. Feb. 10, 2025). Pitsilides was convicted in 1998 in Pennsylvania for criminal conspiracy to commit pool selling and bookmaking, and two counts of pool selling and bookmaking. These offenses are classified as first-degree misdemeanors in Pennsylvania, punishable by up to five years imprisonment. Consequently, under 18 USC 922(g)(1), Pitsilides was barred from possessing a firearm. Despite these convictions, Pitsilides continued to engage in illegal gambling activities, leading to further convictions in Virginia in 2011 for operating an illegal gambling enterprise. The Middle District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment in favor of the Government, applying the two-step framework from Binderup v. Attorney General, 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc). It concluded Pitsilides failed to show his convictions were not serious and rejected his argument that his offenses fell within the carveout for business-related offenses under 18 USC 921(a)(20)(A). The Third Circuit noted the legal landscape has changed significantly since the District Court's decision, particularly with the Supreme Court's rulings in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S.1 (2022), and United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), and the Third Circuit's en banc decision in Range v. Attorney General. 124 F.4th 218 (3d Cir. 2024) (en banc). These cases emphasized the need for individualized assessments of whether a felon poses a danger to public safety when challenging firearm prohibitions under the Second Amendment. The Third Circuit concluded the record was insufficient to determine whether 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to Pitsilides. The court remanded the case to the District Court for further factual development to assess whether Pitsilides poses a special danger of misusing firearms. Because the "dangerousness" principle cannot operate "at such a high level of generality that it waters down the right," United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 740 (2024), a special danger of firearm misuse justifies disarmament when the harm at risk is relevantly similar to the kinds of harm that history shows justify disarmament, see id. at 698 (observing that "[s]ection 922(g)(8) restricts gun use to mitigate demonstrated threats of physical violence, just as the surety and going armed laws do"); Range v. Att'y Gen., 124 F.4th 218, 276 (3d Cir. 2024) (en banc) ("[We cannot] blindly defer to a categorical presumption that a given individual permanently presents a special risk of danger."). A danger posed by firearm misuse today need not match a historically recognized danger with precision. See Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 698 (recognizing as a matter of "common sense" that "[w]hen an individual poses a clear threat of physical violence to another, the threatening individual may be disarmed"); id. at 705 (noting that the Court upheld a law disarming individuals subject to domestic violence restraining orders even though the "law at the founding . . . protect[ed] husbands who abused their spouses").
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