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SAMARITAN NEWSLETTER – 01-27- 2025

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SAMARITAN PROJECTS LLC

P.O. Box 9244

Springfield, MO 65801-9244

 

The SAMARITAN-PROJECT prepares post-conviction and compassionate release motions. The Project retrieves documents at reasonable prices. The Project newsletter reports every winning published district court and court of appeals case for the week in review. Our website – SAMARITANPROJECTS.COM is available to your family and friends.

 

CR.RIS/FAMILY CRCUMSTANCES. The Eastern District of Washington granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Jose Muniz, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11559 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 22, 2025). On Nov. 7, 2018, defendant pled guilty to Conspiracy to Distribute 500 grams or more of a Mixture or Substance Containing a Detectable Amount of Methamphetamine and 5 kilograms of Cocaine in violation of 21 USC 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846. On July 22, 2019, he was sentenced to 135 months. On Feb. 15, 2024, the Court granted defendant's Motion for Sentence Reduction under Amendment 821 for zero-point offenders, reducing his sentence to 108 months. Defendant asserted he is the sole available caregiver for his ailing wife and their six children, and due to her deteriorating condition and the recovery of one of his children from Leukemia, he is needed to care for them. Defendant identifies as his reasons for seeking relief the severe deteriorating medical condition of his wife; that one of his children is in remission from Leukemia, setting them back in school and requiring assistance; and that family members that could care for his family have other care obligations. The Court found that family medical conditions and circumstances listed in defendant's motion rise to the level of "extraordinary and compelling." Sentence reduced to time served.

 

CR.RIS/MEDICAL. The Northern District of Indiana granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Paul Carter, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11175 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 22, 2025). Defendant received a lengthy prison sentence for his role in an armed bank robbery. But late last year, he suffered a debilitating stroke. He movd for compassionate release. In Dec. 2020, defendant pled guilty to an Information charging him with armed robbery in violation of 18 USC 2113(a) and (d), and possessing, using, and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18 USC 924(c). He received a sentence of 141 months including a statutory mandatory minimum seven years on the firearm count. That sentence was later reduced to 130 months after defendant moved for relief under Amendment 821. The defendant had a stroke. A brain CT confirmed the stroke, and defendant underwent brain surgery to remove blood clots in his brain. Later tests showed significant brain damage. Because of the brain damage, defendant now suffers expressive and receptive aphasia, he struggles to both speak and understand speech. A speech pathologist at a long-term care hospital where defendant was temporarily housed suggested defendant receive "daily treatment" in cognitive communication, language, voice, oral health, and swallowing. Defendant was also recommended for a special diet to address his nutritional needs, and it was further recommended that defendant be assisted and monitored while eating because of his difficulty swallowing. Nothing about the BOP's response to defendant's condition to date fills the Court with confidence that the BOP is accurately describing defendant's condition now or can treat his condition in the future. Defendant's request for compassionate release was granted. The Court ordered the balance of defendant's 130 months imprisonment be served on supervised release.

 

CR.RIS/DISPARITY/FAMILY CIRCUMSTANCES. The District of Kansas granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Walter Sands, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10202 (D. Kan. Jan. 21, 2025). On Feb. 16, 2007, defendant was convicted by a jury of : (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute at least fifty grams of methamphetamine; (2) possession with intent to distribute or distribution of five grams or more of methamphetamine; (3) use of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime; (4) possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine; and (5) being a felon in possession of a firearm. On Sept. 24, 2008, the court sentenced defendant to 360 months on the three drug counts running concurrently, 120 months on the felon in possession count running concurrently with the drug counts, and 60 months on the 924(c) count running consecutively to all other counts, for a controlling sentence of 420 months. On Feb. 10, 2015, defendant's sentence was reduced from 420 months to 384 months, a 36-month reduction pursuant to 18 USC 3582(c)(2), based on a guideline sentencing range that had subsequently been lowered by two levels and made retroactive by the Sentencing Commission. Defendant argued the following as extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying his compassionate release in this case: (1) he is serving a "draconian" sentence that would be substantially lower under the current sentencing scheme, (2) the disparity between sentences based on actual methamphetamine and methamphetamine mixtures, and (3) family circumstances-he needs to care for his wife. Defendant argued that his "draconian" sentence represents an unusually long sentence under USSG 1B1.13(b)(6) that should be reduced because, under the law today, his prior drug felony was not a "serious drug offense" that would trigger a sentencing enhancement under 21 USC 851. Defendant offered as an extraordinary and compelling reason the ten-fold disparity in the guideline calculation of actual methamphetamine versus methamphetamine mixture leading some courts to have a policy disagreement with this sentencing guideline disparity. While the Court rejected any suggestion that the disparity in the calculation of actual methamphetamine versus methamphetamine mixture is alone a sufficient reason to grant relief, the disparity in some circumstances may be a relevant consideration. This is such a circumstance. Courts that have articulated a policy disagreement with the disparity in actual methamphetamine versus methamphetamine mixture have noted several concerns. First the 10-to-1 disparity is neither based on science nor empirical evidence. Second, there is too much emphasis placed on the purity of methamphetamine which does not always correlate with a defendant's culpability or level in the hierarchy of a drug trafficking organization. The Court was troubled by the conversion of methamphetamine mixture to actual methamphetamine for several reasons. First, the purity of the amounts that were actually tested was low, ranging from 28 to 56%. This suggests the very circumstance that has troubled many judges who have articulated a policy disagreement with the guidelines. While some have questioned whether purity equates or correlates with culpability, it is fair to say that generally, the less the purity level, the lower the purchaser in the hierarchy of the drug trafficking organization. Stated another way, one that procures methamphetamine with purity at or near 100%, is likely to be procuring it from the original source or the original source's middleman. The Court finds the disparity in actual methamphetamine and methamphetamine mixture is an extraordinary and compelling reason for relief in this case. The Court did not rule that the disparity is per se an extraordinary and compelling reason in all cases, but as applied in this case it certainly was. Finally, Defendant sought compassionate release so that he can spend time with his wife before she passes. According to an attached letter from his wife, she is being cared for by her brother and his wife. The defendant did not establish he was the sole available caregiver available for his wife per the requirements of Section 1B1.13(b)(3)(A). Defendant’s sentence was reduced to time served.

 

CR.RIS/FSA/404(b). The Eastern District of Virginia granted in part a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Antoine Allen, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10612 (E.D. Va. Jan. 21, 2025). On Feb. 26, 2004, Allen and seventeen other individuals were charged in a two-count Second Superseding Indictment of Conspiracy to Commit Violations of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") Act in violation of 18 USC 1962(d), between the years 1998 and 2003 (Count One), and Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute and to Distribute Cocaine Base in violation of 21 USC 846, between the years 1998 and 2003 (Count Two). On March 2, 2004, Allen, along with the other defendants named in the Second Superseding Indictment, was charged in a two-count Third Superseding Indictment of Conspiracy to Commit Violations of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") Act in violation of 18 USC 1962(d), between the years 1998 and 2003 (Count One), and Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute and to Distribute Cocaine Base in violation of 21 USC 846, between the years 1998 and 2003 (Count Two). On Aug. 3, 2004, following a seven-day trial, a jury found Allen guilty on both counts of the Third Superseding Indictment. On Nov. 17, 2004, the Court sentenced Allen to a term of Life imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently to each other and with his then-present state sentence. The Government conceded Allen is eligible for a sentence reduction on Count Two, but maintains he is ineligible for such relief on Count One because the First Step Act does not modify statutory penalties for RICO convictions. Following the Government's concession Count Two qualified as a "covered offense" under the First Step Act, the Supreme Court clarified the scope of a "covered offense." Terry v. United States, 593 U.S. 486, 492 (2021) (defining a "covered offense" as an individual offense for which the statutory penalties were modified for the First Step Act). While Allen's RICO conspiracy conviction is not a covered offense that automatically authorizes the Court to reduce Allen's, this does not the end of the Court's analysis. The Court "has the discretion to reduce both covered and noncovered offenses under the First Step Act if they function as a package. Combined with a Criminal History Category of V, the Guideline Range for Counts One and Two remain life imprisonment on each count. However, the statute restricts the sentence on Count Two to a maximum of forty years imprisonment. The Court concluded that a reduction in Allen's sentence from life to 40-years on each count to run concurrently, was warranted.

 

CR.RIS/REHABILITATION/MEDICAL. The Middle District of Tennessee granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Antonio Lee, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9238 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 17, 2025). The defendant has served nearly 16 years of a 19-year sentence with an anticipated release date of Feb. 5, 2029. He has been incarcerated since 2009 and is 47 years old. Medical records establish he is often confined to a wheelchair and has "significant spinal degeneration and stenosis” and the pain from which is not being well-controlled. He has Type 2 diabetes and neuropathy, is morbidly obese with a BMI of 49.2, and has hypertension and osteoarthritis. The stenosis particularly can be characterized as a medical condition that requires "long-term or specialized medical care" and the court finds that that care "is not being provided" and that, without it, the defendant "is at risk of serious deterioration in [his] health.” The court found that the defendant's medical condition and demonstrated rehabilitation provide extraordinary and compelling reasons for his compassionate release and the 18 USC 3553(a) factors do not militate against release. Defendant’s sentence was reduced to time served.

APPEAL/2255/IAC/EVIDENTIARY HEARING. The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded United States v. Allen McNeil, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 1376 (4th Cir. Jan. 22, 2025). In Sept. 2018, police officers in Fayetteville, North Carolina, observed a car performing a U-turn and stopping in front of Allen Wendell McNeil's house. After a brief interaction with the car's occupants the police conducted a traffic stop and found a small bag of marijuana on the passenger. Without a warrant, the officers then went to McNeil's house for a "knock and talk." When McNeil's children answered the door and said he was not home the officers proceeded to the backyard where they found McNeil in a shed and detected the smell of marijuana. This led to McNeil's detention and the subsequent search and seizure of marijuana, money, and guns from his property. McNeil was charged with marijuana distribution and firearm possession. He pled guilty without a plea agreement and he was sentenced to 114 months in prison. McNeil's direct appeal was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit. McNeil filed a pro se petition under 28 USC 2255 claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a motion to suppress evidence obtained from the warrantless search and for not pursuing a plea agreement despite his requests. The district court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing ruling that McNeil's Fourth Amendment claim was frivolous and that his statements during the Rule 11 hearing precluded his ineffective assistance claim regarding the plea agreement. The Fourth Circuit concluded McNeil's ineffective assistance claims could not be resolved on the existing record. The court held the district court erred in dismissing McNeil's claims without an evidentiary hearing, as the facts surrounding the police officers' entry into the backyard and the plea negotiations required further factual development. The Fourth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing.

 

APPEAL/922(g)(1). The Third Circuit vacated and remanded United States v. Aqudre Quailes, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 1107 (3d Cir. Jan. 17, 2025). Quailes and Ayinda Harper were separately charged with being felons in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 USC 922(g)(1). Harper was on Pennsylvania state parole when his probation officer discovered photographs of him holding firearms on social media. During a home visit, officers found a semiautomatic pistol in his residence. Harper had 13 prior felony convictions. Quailes, on parole for one of his six prior felony convictions was arrested for absconding from parole. Authorities found firearms and ammunition in his girlfriend’s apartment where he had been staying. The Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissed both indictments ruling that 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. The court reasoned that the defendants status as parolees or probationers did not negate their Second Amendment rights. The Government appealed arguing that 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to state parolees and probationers. The Third Circuit held that 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to Quailes and Harper because neither had completed their criminal sentences. The court referenced its en banc decision in Range v. Attorney General, which held that 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional for a felon who had completed his sentence which upheld the constitutionality of 922(g)(1) for felons still serving their sentences. The court concluded historical practices support disarming convicts who are still serving their sentences, including those on state parole or probation. Consequently, the Third Circuit reversed the district court’s orders and remanded the cases for further proceedings.

 

APPEAL/RESENTENCE. The District of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded United States v. Brown, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 1219 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 17, 2025). Jeffrey Brown, Markus Maly, and Peter Schwartz were tried and convicted by a jury for assaulting police officers on the Capitol grounds on Jan. 6, 2021. They traveled separately to Washington, D.C., and participated in the riot following then-President Trump’s rally. Evidence showed that Maly and Schwartz assaulted officers on the Lower West Terrace with Schwartz throwing a chair and both using pepper spray. All three later entered the Tunnel where they used pepper spray against officers and attempted to push through the police line. The District of Columbia denied Schwartz’s motions to suppress evidence obtained from his cellphone and to sever the trials. The court found that the FBI had compelled Schwartz to unlock his phone but ruled that this act was not testimonial. The jury convicted all three defendants on all counts and the district court sentenced Schwartz to 170 months, Maly to 72 months, and Brown to 54 months. The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed Brown’s and Maly’s convictions and Brown’s sentence. It vacated Schwartz’s conviction on the 18 USC 1512(c)(2) charge and remanded for resentencing. The court held that compelling Schwartz to unlock his cellphone violated the Fifth Amendment and remanded to the district court to determine which, if any, of Schwartz’s counts of conviction must be vacated due to this error. The court found sufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings tthe defendants used pepper spray and, in Schwartz’s case, a chair as deadly or dangerous weapons. The court upheld the district court’s refusal to give a special unanimity instruction for Maly’s Section 111 counts and found no abuse of discretion in Brown’s sentencing.

 

APPEAL/RESENTENCE. The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded United States v. Tytus Lamar Shields, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 1374 (4th Cir. Jan. 22, 2025). Shields pled guilty to possession of a firearm as a felon violating 18 USC 922(g)(1). In Nov. 2021, law enforcement in Parkersburg, WV, received information that Shields was transporting drugs. Shields was on bond for pending charges in Ohio and considered a fugitive. He was arrested at his residence, where officers seized drugs, cash, and a loaded firearm. Shields admitted the firearm was his. He was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm knowing he had prior Ohio felony convictions including one for drug trafficking. The Southern District of West Virginia calculated an advisory Sentencing Guidelines range of 51 to 63 months and sentenced Shields to 51 months. Shields argued for a downward variance citing an unwarranted sentencing disparity between his case and similar cases in West Virginia but the district court did not address this argument. The court focused on Shields’s criminal history and sustained the Government’s objection to the PSR, which had not applied the increased base offense level for a "controlled substance offense." The Fourth Circuit found the district court committed procedural error by failing to address Shields’s non-frivolous argument for a downward variance based on sentencing disparities. The appellate court held the district court must consider and explain its reasoning regarding such arguments to allow for meaningful appellate review. The Fourth Circuit vacated Shields’s sentence and remanded for resentencing, emphasizing the need for the district court to address all non-frivolous arguments presented by the defendant.

 

APPEAL/RESENTENCE. The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded United States v. Conor Fitzpatrick, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 1259 (4th Cir. Jan. 21, 2025). Fitzpatrick pled guilty to conspiracy to traffic in stolen personally identifying information, fraudulent solicitation of personally identifying information, and possession of child pornography. While released on bond awaiting sentencing, Fitzpatrick violated his conditions of release by secretly downloading a virtual private network and accessing the Internet without his probation officer's knowledge. At sentencing the district court calculated Fitzpatrick’s advisory Guidelines sentencing range to be 188 to 235 months but sentenced him to a 17-day time-served term of imprisonment, citing his autism spectrum disorder and youth. The Eastern District of Virginia initially handled the case. Fitzpatrick was released on bond pending sentencing subject to several special conditions which he violated. The district court considering Fitzpatrick’s autism and youth imposed a significantly reduced sentence of 17 days, arguing that the Federal Bureau of Prisons would not be able to treat Fitzpatrick’s autism spectrum disorder and he would be vulnerable in prison. The Fourth Circuit found the district court abused its discretion by imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence. The Fourth Circuit held the district court failed to adequately consider the seriousness of Fitzpatrick’s offenses, the need to promote respect for the law, to deter similar wrongdoing, and to protect the public. The court vacated the 17-day sentence and remanded the case for resentencing emphasizing that a sentence must fulfill the purposes of punishment, deterrence, and incapacitation.

 

APPEAL/RESENTENCE. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated and remanded United States v. Ralph Celentrano, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 1273 (D.C. Cir. Jan 21, 2025). On Jan. 6, 2021, Celentano participated in the events at the United States Capitol, where he was involved in altercations with law enforcement officers. He was convicted by a jury on six counts related to his conduct that day including forcibly shoving Officer Kenrick Ellis off a ledge. Celentano challenged his convictions on several grounds including errors in jury instructions and sentencing. The District of Columbia convicted Celentano on six counts and acquitted him on one count. The district court sentenced him to 78 months of imprisonment on Count One with concurrent sentences on the other counts, and 36 months of supervised release on Counts One and Two. Celentano appealed arguing the district court erred in its jury instructions and sentencing calculations. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found the district court's jury instruction on the defense of another was erroneous because it required the jury to consider the use of force from the perspective of a reasonable law enforcement officer rather than from Celentano's perspective. This error was not harmless regarding Count One, leading the court to vacate Celentano's conviction on that count. The error was deemed harmless for Counts Two, Five, and Six due to overwhelming evidence of Celentano's other violent acts. The court addressed Celentano's Double Jeopardy challenge noting it was no longer a live issue due to the vacatur of Count One. The court rejected Celentano's challenge to the jury instructions on Counts Three, Four, and Five, citing precedent that the Government only needed to prove Celentano knew he was in a restricted area. Finally, the court vacated Celentano's sentence due to several errors in the Sentencing Guidelines calculation and remanded the case for resentencing.  

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