NEWSLETTER – July 1, 2025

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SAMARITAN NEWSLETTER – June 30, 2025

The SAMARITAN-PROJECT prepares post-conviction and compassionate release motions under the direction of Attorney Tom Norrid. The Project retrieves documents at reasonable prices. The Project newsletter reports every winning district court and court of appeals case for the week in review. Our website – SAMARITANPROJECTS.COM is available to your family and friends.

SUPREME COURT/FIRST STEP ACT. Hewitt v. United States, No. 23-1002, 2025 U.S. LEXIS 2494 (S. Ct. June 26, 2025). In 2009, Tony Hewitt, Corey Duffey, and Jarvis Ross were convicted of multiple counts of bank robbery and conspiracy, along with corresponding 924(c) offenses for using a firearm during a crime of violence. Each received a mandatory 5-year sentence for the first 924(c) count and 25-year mandatory sentences for each additional count, resulting in sentences exceeding 325 years. After successfully challenging some convictions, the Fifth Circuit vacated their sentences, and they were re-sentenced to between 285 and 305 years. Following the First Step Act of 2018, which reduced mandatory minimum penalties for first-time 924(c) offenders, the District Court vacated more convictions and re-sentenced them under the pre-Act scheme, resulting in sentences of 130 years or more. The Fifth Circuit denied the joint request by petitioners and the Government to apply the First Step Act’s more lenient penalties, holding that 403(b) applies only to defendants who had not been sentenced as of the Act’s enactment. Since the petitioners had been sentenced twice before the Act, the court concluded they were ineligible for the Act’s benefits. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Fifth Circuit’s decision, holding that under 403(b) of the First Step Act, a sentence “has been imposed” only if it remains valid and has not been vacated. Therefore, the Act’s more lenient penalties apply to defendants whose previous 924(c) sentences have been vacated and who need to be re-sentenced following the Act’s enactment. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation.

CR.RIS/MEDICAL. The Northern District of Oklahoma granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Brittany Welch, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122728 (N.D. Okla. June 26, 2025). The Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons filed to reduce Welch's term of imprisonment to time served pursuant to 18 USC 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The Government asked the Court to reduce Welch's 33-month prison term to time served because she has been diagnosed with a terminal illness and has a limited life expectancy. Welch pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances including 500 grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 USC 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii), and 846. Welch has been diagnosed with stage IV adenocarcinoma of the colon that has metastasized to her liver. Welch's diagnosis of advanced stage metastatic adenocarcinoma is an extraordinary and compelling reason for a reduction in sentence. Sentence reduced to time served.

CR.RIS/MEDICAL. The District of Colorado granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Salvatore Andretti, No. 09-CR-479 (D. Colo. June 25, 2025). In this case Andretti pled guilty to two counts of armed bank robbery and one count of use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence and he was sentenced to a total term of 384 months. Andretti met his burden to prove his medical condition satisfies the requirements of this section and presumptively warrants compassionate release. Andretti is currently 72 years old. The record shows he suffers from a host of age-related medical issues, most seriously Type 2 diabetes. Many of these medical conditions are chronic, under poor control or either untreatable or not fully responsive to treatment, and likely to worsen with time and advancing age. The court held that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a sentence reduction because Andretti is “suffering from a medical condition that requires long-term or specialized medical care that is not being provided and without which [he] is at risk of serious deterioration in health or death.” USSG 1B1.13(b)(1)(C). Sentence reduced to time served.

CR.RIS/MEDICAL. The Eastern District of Michigan granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Alvin Bufkin, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120736 (E.D. Mich. June 25, 2025). Bufkin argued his serious health conditions, including end stage renal disease, dependence on renal dialysis, severe anemia, hypertension, and glaucoma are extraordinary and compelling circumstances warranting a reduction in sentence. On Jan. 6, 2023, Bufkin entered a guilty plea on Counts 1, 3, 4 and 6 of the Indictment charging him with violations of 21 USC 841(a)(1), possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, 21 USC 843(a)(6), unlawful possession of a tableting machine to manufacture a controlled substance, 21 USC 843(a)(5), unlawful possession of a die to produce counterfeit controlled substance; and 18 USC 922(g), possession of a firearm by a previously convicted felon. The court sentenced Bufkin to 96 months. The Government conceded Bufkin's end-stage renal disease qualifies as an extraordinary and compelling circumstance. Indeed, defendant's end stage renal disease falls within the definition of extraordinary and compelling under 1B1.13(b)(1)(A) because Bufkin "is suffering from a terminal illness (i.e., a serious and advanced illness with an end-of-life trajectory)[,]" including "end-stage organ disease[.]" USSG 1B1.13(b)(1)(A). Failure to provide Bufkin with needed follow-up care for suspected cancer suggests MCFP Springfield is not equipped to provide the long-term and specialized medical care Bufkin requires, and without such care, Bufkin is at risk of serious deterioration in health or death. USSG 1B1.13(b)(1)(C). Sentence reduced to time served.

CR.RIS/DISPARITY/USSG 1B1.13(b)(6). The Western District of Virginia granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Clinton Martin, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117849 (W.D. Va. June 20, 2025). Martin entered into a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement in which he pled guilty to one count of conspiring to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture containing methamphetamine in violation of 21 USC 846 and 841 in exchange for a sentence of 20 years. Martin sought compassionate release based on his assertion if sentenced today he would no longer be subject to an enhanced sentence because his underlying predicate offense no longer qualifies as a "serious drug felony." It is undisputed Martin did not serve a term of imprisonment on the underlying drug charge that was cited as the predicate offense for the 851 enhancement. He served a 3-year term of unsupervised probation. The court concluded Concepcion and the Commission's policy statement in 1B1.13(b)(6) "serve to confirm and amplify" the court's earlier ruling in McCoy that "[n]on-retroactive changes in law remain relevant when a court has to decide when and how to modify a sentence," and a court abuses its discretion when it fails to consider the changes. The court found reducing Martin's sentence to 15 years was consistent with USSG 1B1.13(b)(6).

APPEAL/SUPERVISED RELEASE TERMINATION. The Sixth Circuit remanded United States v. Edwin Tavarez, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 15395 (6th Cir. June 23, 2025). Tavarez acted as a courier for his brother's illegal cocaine business, delivering cocaine to a restaurant in Lakewood, Ohio. After his brother's death, Tavarez continued the operation until he was arrested in Feb. 2019. Authorities found him in possession of two kilograms of cocaine. In July 2019, Tavarez was charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, possession with intent to distribute, and use of a communications facility in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. He pled guilty to the first two charges and the third was dismissed. Tavarez was sentenced to 18 months and four years of supervised release, including one year of home detention. The Northern District of Ohio granted Tavarez's motion for compassionate release in Sept. 2021, reducing his sentence to time served and extending his home detention. In June 2022, the court terminated the special condition of home detention. In June 2023, Tavarez filed a pro se motion for early termination of supervised release, citing good behavior and mishandling of his earned time credit. The district court denied the motion in a summary order and denied his subsequent motion for access to the underlying documents. The Sixth Circuit held 18 USC 3742(a) does not impede its review of the district court's denial of Tavarez's early termination motion. The court found the district court abused its discretion by not demonstrating it considered the relevant 3553(a) factors when denying the motion. The Sixth Circuit vacated the district court's order denying early termination of supervised release and remanded.

APPEAL/ERLINGER. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded United States v. Evelio Santana, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 15522 (7th Cir. June 24, 2025). Santana pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. He was enhanced under ACCA after the district judge found by a preponderance of the evidence Santana had three prior convictions for violent felonies committed on different occasions. Santana argued the determination should have been made by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt as required by Erlinger v. United States. The judge determined Santana's prior convictions were committed on different occasions and sentenced him to the mandatory minimum of 15 years in prison under the ACCA. Santana's lawyer had agreed with the judge's authority to make this determination based on then-current Seventh Circuit precedent. The Government argued a jury should make the determination but the judge overruled the objection. The Seventh Circuit found error because the judge, not a jury, made the different-occasions determination by a preponderance of the evidence contrary to the Supreme Court's ruling in Erlinger. The error was plain and affected Santana's substantial rights by increasing his sentence. The court concluded the error undermined the fairness and integrity of the proceedings, as a reasonable jury might have found reasonable doubt about whether the prior felonies were committed on different occasions. The Seventh Circuit vacated Santana's sentence and remanded for resentencing consistent with the decision in Erlinger.