The Law Office of Tom Norrid
SAMARITAN PROJECTS LLC
P.O. Box 9244
Springfield, MO 65801-9244
Rusty 417-236-1179 – Eddie 417-818-1938
The SAMARITAN-PROJECT prepares post-conviction and compassionate release motions under the direction of Attorney Tom Norrid. The Project retrieves documents at reasonable prices. The Project newsletter reports every winning published district court and court of appeals case for the week in review.
NINE SAMARITAN CLIENTS WERE GRANTED COMMUTATION OF SENTENCE ON JANUARY 17, 2025. CALL IF YOU WANT TO CHECK ON THE STATUS OF YOUR COMMUTATION APPLICATION.
CR.RIS/REHABILITATION/USSG 1B1.13(b)(5). The District of Connecticut granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Richard Lespier, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8497 (D. Conn. Jan. 16, 2025). In 1999, Lespier was sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of life in prison, having been convicted after a trial of a violent crime committed in aid of a racketeering enterprise: the murder of an individual named Carlito Brown. the Court concluded Lespier established extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction and that a sentence of time served satisfies the purposes of sentencing set forth in 18 USC 3553(a). Lespier has served nearly 26 years in prison for Brown's murder. During that time, he has earned a GED, worked for UNICOR for more than a decade, volunteered with the BOP's suicide watch team, successfully and voluntarily completed dozens of programs, and stayed free of disciplinary violations for the last eleven years. The combination of Lespier's unusually long sentence, his laudable rehabilitation while in custody, and his mother's grave health situation, suffice as extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction. While none of these circumstances alone would constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons, they do when combined. Even among murder sentences, a sentence of life imprisonment appears atypical. In 2023, the national mean sentence imposed for murder offenses was 285 months, and the median was 276 months; in the Second Circuit, the mean murder sentence was 249 months and the median was 240 months. Lespier has already served about 311 months, far longer than these mean and median murder sentences. Sentence reduced to time served.
CR.RIS/FAMILY CIRCUMSTANES/MEDICAL. The Southern District of California granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Lorena Vieyra, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8950 (S.D. N.Y. Jan. 13, 2025). Before the Court was Vieyra's motion for Compassionate Release, detailing that her mother has been under constant physical, mental, and emotional stress and finds it increasingly difficult to care for her own physical health along with the caretaking needs of her physically and mentally disabled son and nine minor grandchildren, five of whom belong to Ms. Vieyra. On Nov. 17, 2023, this Court sentenced defendant to 20 months in custody to run concurrent for importing 2.3 kilograms of fentanyl and 3.18 kilograms of cocaine. The defendant is currently placed at a halfway house and is gainfully employed, working full-time. At the time of her sentencing the defendant was in full compliance with the conditions of her pretrial release and was allowed to self-surrender to serve her sentence, which she did on Jan. 22, 2024, as ordered. As of the date of this order the defendant has served 11 months of her 20-month sentence. During the summer of 2024, Lorena suffered two heart attacks, which decreased her heart function from 100% to 60% and she also suffers from a painful sciatic nerve and was recently diagnosed with a herniated disc. She is unable to stand or walk for more than ten minutes. Sentence reduced to time served.
CR.RIS/YOUTH/REHABILTATION. The District of Rhode Island granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. George Sepulveda, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5549 (D. R.I. Jan. 10, 2025). Sepulveda along with other members of the Latin Kings gang was convicted in 1997 of a multicount racketeering indictment under RICO. Sepulveda and co-defendant Terrence Boyd had ordered other Latin King members to murder the leader of a rival gang, Jose Mendez. Sepulveda asked the Court to reduce his life without parole sentence under 18 USC 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) asserting that his sentence was usually long considering the evolving science, law, and societal understanding of life sentences without parole for emerging adults. After a trial by a jury Sepulveda was found guilty of five counts: Counts 1 (RICO), 2 (conspiracy to commit RICO), 4 (committing a violent crime in aid of RICO), 9 (witness intimidation), and 13 (possessing a firearm as a felon). The district court imposed three concurrent life sentences for the RICO, RICO conspiracy, and violent crime convictions, a concurrent twenty-year term for the witness intimidation conviction, and a concurrent ten-year term for the firearms offense. To support his motion for modification of his term of imprisonment, Sepulveda cited as extraordinary and compelling reasons his youthful age at the time of the offense, his turbulent upbringing, his traumatic brain injury, his unusually long sentence compared to similarly situated defendants, risks posed by COVID-19, ongoing medical conditions, and his rehabilitation. When Sepulveda committed his crime, he was 20 years old. He had experienced a very traumatic upbringing, being raised in a poor, unstable, and abusive environment in which he and his family suffered from extreme physical and emotional abuse for many years. From a very young age, Sepulveda had to watch his mother get repeatedly beaten by his stepfather, was himself beaten, and then, after a time, had to flee with his mother and younger sibling from New York to Rhode Island to escape the abuse. Unfortunately, his abusive stepfather learned of their location and followed them to Rhode Island where the physical abuse continued, along with psychological abuse in the form of constant fear of death due to threats made by his stepfather with firearms. He then was sent to live with drug addicted family members that pushed him to sell drugs to survive, and at just 14 years old he ended up on the street where he was welcomed in by the Latin Kings gang. He became dependent on the gang for food, clothing, money, and a place to live. They became his source of survival, safety, and structure—his de facto new family. The Court concluded that today it is no longer appropriate to sentence a youthful offender under these circumstances to a sentence of death in prison. This presents extraordinary and compelling reasons to modify Sepulveda's sentence. While the Court determined that a life without parole sentence for Sepulveda represents a sentence that is unusually long considering his age at the time he committed the crime, the fact that he was not the perpetrator of the murder, and other factors concerning his history and characteristics, the Court cannot determine at this time, under 18 USC 3553(a) what is the appropriate less-than-life sentence. Toward that end the Court ordered resentencing for Sepulveda including an updated Presentence Investigation Report, appointment of counsel for Sepulveda's resentencing, notification and input from the victim(s), briefing by the government and Sepulveda's attorney, and a sentencing hearing.
APPEAL/CR.RIS. The Second Circuit reversed and remanded a CR.RIS case in United States v. Frank Castillo, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 915 (2d Cir. Jan. 15, 2025). Castillo appealed from an order of the Southern District of New York entered on Feb. 28, 2023, denying his second motion for compassionate release under 18 USC 3582(c)(1)(A). Castillo principally argues the district court misinterpreted then-Application Note 1(B) to USSG 1B1.13 ("Note 1(B)")1 and, in doing so, abused its discretion in concluding that Castillo had not demonstrated "extraordinary and compelling" reasons for release. Under Note 1(B), extraordinary and compelling reasons exist if "[t]he defendant (i) is at least 65 years old; (ii) is experiencing a serious deterioration in physical or mental health because of the aging process; and (iii) has served at least 10 years or 75 percent of his or her term of imprisonment, whichever is less." The district court's order stated that when applying Note 1(B) "courts typically grant compassionate release only to senior citizen defendants whose physical and cognitive deterioration has impaired basic human functions," and cited four district court opinions. The court then reasoned although "Castillo is 65 years old," "has served over ten years in prison," and has "been diagnosed with several age-related medical issues including an enlarged prostate, heart disease, and eye problems," his advanced age combined with his associated health issues do not constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for release because "Castillo's health conditions are not impairing him from carrying out basic human functions or living independently in prison." Additionally, the court found "[e]ven if" Castillo had shown an extraordinary and compelling reason for release, "the 3553(a) factors weigh[ed] against early release." The court held that a remand for clarification is appropriate in the instant case because the district court's order is ambiguous in its interpretation of Note 1(B). It was unclear to the court whether the district court believed it could not find that "extraordinary and compelling reasons" exist for a reduction in sentence unless it also found the physical deterioration suffered by Castillo "impaired basic human functions." The court looked to Note 1(B) to guide its discretion and while it did not dispute that Castillo met the criteria stated expressly in Note 1(B) for extraordinary and compelling circumstances, it denied the motion. It then added that compassionate release is "typically grant[ed]" "only to senior citizen defendants whose 'physical and cognitive deterioration has impaired basic human functions.'" If the district court relied on other district court decisions to inform a fact-specific assessment of whether Castillo's own health conditions constituted a "serious deterioration in physical or mental health," then it acted well within its "broad" discretion. If, however, the district court's denial was based on the view that Note 1(B) applies only to defendants whose health conditions impair basic human functions, the court erred; the plain text of the Note contains no such requirement. Given this ambiguity, the court believed that a remand is appropriate to allow the district court to clarify its reasoning. Although the court remanded for clarification of the basis for the denial of compassionate release, on remand the district court may reconsider Castillo's arguments and determine anew whether it should grant the motion for compassionate release. There is also some ambiguity as to whether the district court intended its analysis of the 3553(a) factors to constitute an independent basis for its holding. Out of an abundance of caution, the court declined to resolve that ambiguity.
APPEAL/FALSE STATEMENTS. The Ninth Circuit reinstated criminal charges in United States v. Namrata Panaik, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 804 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 2025). The defendants, Namrata Patnaik and Kartiki Parekh, served as chief executive officer and human resources manager of a semiconductor chip design consulting and staffing company, respectively. They were charged with submitting fraudulent H-1B visa applications by falsely stating the visa applicants would be working on internal projects on-site, while in reality, they were contracted out to other companies. The Government alleged these false statements were material misrepresentations that could influence the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in granting the visas. The Northern District of California dismissed the indictment accepting the defendants' argument that the false statements could not be materially false because it was unlawful for the Government to ask for such information. The district court relied on the ITServe All., Inc. v. Cissna decision and a USCIS memorandum that suggested USCIS could not require details about specific projects or work assignments. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that lying on H-1B visa applications constitutes visa fraud even if the Government asked questions it was not legally entitled to ask, as long as the misrepresentations could have influenced USCIS at the time they were made. The court emphasized that the Government may protect itself against fraud regardless of whether it had the right to ask the questions. The case was remanded for reinstatement of the criminal charges against the defendants.
APPEAL/RESENTENCE. The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded United States v. Deshawn Martin, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 834 (11th Cir. Jan. 14, 2025). Martin appealed his sentence of 240 months for conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 USC 1951(a), (b), 2, and 371. Martin argued the district court procedurally erred at sentencing by failing to give any consideration to the guideline sentencing range. He also argued the district court substantively erred by imposing a sentence that was unreasonable because it did not give sufficient weight to the guideline range and created unwarranted sentencing disparities between Martin and similar offenders. The court affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. On appeal, Martin presents two issues: (1) the district court procedurally erred when imposing his sentence because it failed to give any consideration to the guideline range; and (2) the district court’s above-guideline sentence of 240 months was substantively unreasonable and created unwarranted sentencing disparities. The court cannot find that Martin’s sentence was substantively reasonable. After a review of the sentencing record the court could see no compelling justification to vary upward by 115 months and sentence Martin to the statutory maximum for a Hobbs Act robbery. To be sure, a district court has discretion to impose a longer sentence than what the guideline range suggests, but that discretion is not limitless. And here, there is a disconnect between the factors that the district court cited to calculate the sentence and the facts it purported to consider in justifying that sentence. The court concluded the district court abused its discretion by giving inadequate consideration to the guideline range and weighing Martin’s criminal history and the need for specific and general
deterrence unreasonably based on the facts it purported to consider, including Martin’s largely nonviolent criminal history and limited time in prison prior to the instant offenses.
APPEAL/ALLOCTION/RESENTENCE. The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded United States v. Allen Pendergrass, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 681 (11th Cir. Jan. 13, 2025). Pendergrass appealed his conviction for participating in a scheme to steal unclaimed property belonging to others. Pendergrass along with co-defendant Terrell McQueen contacted the City of Atlanta and other city and county governments and requested lists of unclaimed funds being held by those entities. They then mailed fraudulent documents to the entities, falsely representing that they were acting on behalf of the owners to recover the funds. After a trial, a jury found Pendergrass guilty of aiding and abetting bank fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and aiding and abetting identity theft. At sentencing, the district court imposed a sentence of 46 months. On appeal, Pendergrass challenged his convictions and sentence on multiple grounds. As to his convictions, he argued, among other things, that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated because of the Government’s delay in indicting him and that there was insufficient evidence to support some of his convictions for aiding and abetting aggravated identity theft. As to his sentence, he stated the district court erred in applying an enhancement for fraud involving an authentication feature and in failing to give him an opportunity to allocute at sentencing. The district court did, however, commit plain error when it failed to afford Pendergrass an opportunity to allocute at the sentencing hearing. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and vacated in part. The court remanded for resentencing after being given an opportunity to allocute.
APPEAL/SUPPRESS. The First Circuit reversed and remanded United States v. Dario Giambro, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 950 (1st Cir. Jan. 15, 2025). Giambro was convicted under 18 USC 922(g)(1) for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The conviction stemmed from evidence found by police officers who forcibly entered his home in Hebron, Maine, without a warrant. The officers entered the home based on information from Giambro's son, Antonio, who reported that his mother, Arline, had died and was not in the house. Giambro argued the warrantless entry violated his Fourth Amendment rights and the evidence should be suppressed. He also challenged the charge on Second Amendment grounds. The District of Maine denied Giambro's motion to suppress ruling that the entry fell within the emergency aid exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. The court found that the officers had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that Arline might be in need of immediate aid despite Antonio's report that she had died and was not in the house. The court also denied Giambro's motion to dismiss the charge on Second Amendment grounds. The First Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court's application of the emergency aid exception. The appellate court held the officers did not have an objectively reasonable basis to believe Arline was alive and in need of immediate aid given that Antonio had been in the house that morning and reported she was not there. The court emphasized the officers should have spoken to Antonio and Giambro who were available for questioning, before forcibly entering the home. Consequently, the First Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress, vacated Giambro's conviction and sentence, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court did not address the Second Amendment claim due to its ruling on the Fourth Amendment issue.
APPEAL/RESTITUTION. The Tenth Circuit vacated and remanded United States v. Wendy Johnson, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 1006 (10th Cir. Jan. 16, 2025). Wendy Johnson pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter after causing the death of Stephanie Heneha-Roubidoux in a drunk-driving accident. The Government sought criminal restitution for Stephanie’s lost income, presenting testimony from an expert and Stephanie’s wife, Kristi Heneha-Roubidoux. Johnson argued for zero lost-income restitution citing the Government’s expert who stated Stephanie would have consumed all her income personally. The district court declined to deduct personal consumption from the restitution award. The Eastern District of Oklahoma sentenced Johnson to 36 months in prison and three years of supervised release without imposing a fine due to her lack of financial resources. The court ordered restitution of $158,009, based on the Government’s reduced request of $208,009 minus a $50,000 insurance settlement received by Kristi. The court found Kristi’s testimony about Stephanie’s income credible and relied on it, despite the defense expert’s criticism of the Government’s expert for not applying a personal-consumption deduction. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in rejecting the personal-consumption deduction for a legally incorrect reason, as household contributions do not fall within “lost income” under the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA). The appellate court vacated the restitution award and remanded the case for the district court to reconsider the personal-consumption deduction and the payment schedule. The appellate court also addressed the sealing of certain documents, granting the parties' request to redact specific private information and keep the district court’s statement of reasons under seal.
APPEAL/RESENTENCE. The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded for resentencing United States v. Eddie Bell, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 543 (5th Cir. Jan. 20, 2025). Bell pled guilty to violating 18 USC 922(g)(1) after being found in possession of a firearm. Bell was discovered by police asleep in his vehicle with a semiautomatic pistol on the center console, a large-capacity magazine, and cocaine. He admitted to being a convicted felon. Before sentencing Bell was involved in an altercation with a fellow inmate, Hipolito Brito, which was captured on video. The video showed Brito initiating physical violence after Bell asked him to stop snoring. Bell was not disciplined or criminally charged for the incident. The Western District of Texas denied Bell a reduction for acceptance of responsibility under USSG 3E1.1, citing the altercation as evidence of continued criminal conduct. The court also applied an elevated offense level under USSG 2K2.1 due to the firearm's capability to accept a large-capacity magazine. Bell was sentenced to 115 months. Bell appealed arguing the district court erred in both denying the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction and applying the elevated offense level. He also challenged the constitutionality of 18 USC 922(g)(1), but conceded this argument was foreclosed in the circuit. The Fifth Circuit agreed with Bell that his pre-sentencing conduct did not outweigh the significant evidence of his acceptance of responsibility, as Bell did not initiate the altercation and appeared to act in self-defense. Consequently, the court vacated Bell's sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court did not address Bell's challenge to the elevated offense level under 2K2.1, noting that the standards in United States v. Luna-Gonzalez would apply on remand.
APPEAL/RESENTENCE. The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded for resentencing United States v. Nghia Le, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 1053 (5th Cir. Jan. 16, 2025). Le was involved in a methamphetamine distribution operation centered at a motorcycle shop rented by Ryan Negrotto. Le supplied methamphetamine to the shop, where drug transactions took place. Le was indicted on multiple charges, including using or maintaining a drug premises. Le admitted to using the shop for drug distribution but contested that he maintained it. The Eastern District of Louisiana applied a two-level offense enhancement under USSG 2D1.1(b)(12), concluding that Le maintained the premises for drug distribution based on his admission in the factual basis supporting his guilty plea. Le objected, arguing that he did not have control over the shop, but the district court overruled his objection and sentenced him to 135 months for the methamphetamine charges, with additional sentences for other charges. The Fifth Circuit found that the district court erred in applying the enhancement based solely on Le's ambiguous admission. The appellate court noted that the factual basis did not clearly establish that Le maintained the shop, as it primarily indicated his use of the premises. The court also found insufficient evidence that Le had a possessory interest or control over the shop. The Fifth Circuit vacated Le's sentence for the methamphetamine charges and remanded for resentencing, allowing the district court to reconsider the enhancement with more developed arguments. The court affirmed the rest of Le's conviction and sentence, rejecting his argument that his sentence was substantively unreasonable.
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